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Summary
This paper surveys the academic literature on optimal saving and investment over an individ-
ual’s life cycle. We start out with a simple benchmark model with separable and smooth prefer-
ences, one aggregate risk factor and riskless wage income. Within this simple setting, optimal sav-
ing and investment behavior are explored from the perspective of individuals. Subsequently, we
investigate various constraints to optimal individual decision making. We discuss how collective
pension schemes may help to relieve some of the market incompleteness that arises from these
constraints while at the same time introducing new types of constraints. Finally, various exten-
sions to the benchmark setting are analyzed: a more elaborate modelling of human capital, addi-
tional risk factors, and other types of preferences.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys the recent academic literature on optimal ﬁnancial plan-
ning of individuals over the life cycle and relates this to the optimal design
of collective pension schemes in facilitating this planning. Collective pension
schemes can relieve borrowing constraints and enable intergenerational risk
sharing but usually impose uniform rules on heterogeneous participants. We
explore the costs and beneﬁts of collective pension schemes versus individ-
ual schemes. Compared to other surveys of the literature on life-cycle con-
sumption and saving (see e.g. Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Browning
and Crossley (2001)), we explore how consumption decisions interact with
risk taking and focus on the role of pension schemes in facilitating life-cycle
ﬁnancial planning.
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Individuals face two main decisions in their ﬁnancial planning over the life
cycle. Through the saving decision, they decide how to smooth consumption
over time by setting the pension premium and the pension beneﬁts. Through
the investment decision, individuals decide how to invest the premia in the
various ﬁnancial assets so as to smooth consumption across various future
contingencies that may arise in the future. Under a set of "golden assump-
tions," the young should invest a larger fraction of their ﬁnancial wealth in
risky assets than the elderly (see e.g. Merton (1971) and Merton and Samuel-
son (1974)). Indeed, life-cycle funds and target-date funds, which are based
on these principles, are popular investment vehicles in many countries.
Teulings and de Vries (2006) outline a stylized model to explore opti-
mal ﬁnancial planning over the life cycle. We outline in detail the arguments
underlying their recommendations for individual saving and investment deci-
sions. In addition, we investigate how robust their recommendations are with
respect to various extensions of their basic model. In particular, we explore
alternative models for labor income, ﬁnancial risks and preferences.
In addition to analyzing optimal saving and investment decisions over
the life cycle, we explore the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in general and
pension funds in particular. Individuals delegate ﬁnancial decision making
to ﬁnancial intermediaries for a variety of reasons. First, individuals lack
the expertise to implement a ﬁnancial plan for their lives. Second, ﬁnancial
intermediaries reduce the costs of long-term ﬁnancial planning by beneﬁting
from the scale economies associated with specialization in acquiring ﬁnan-
cial expertise (e.g. asset management) and accessing ﬁnancial markets. Com-
pulsory participation in collective pension schemes allows these schemes to
smooth consumption across generations by shifting surpluses and deficits to
future generations; the trustees of the pension scheme can decide whether to
pay out the surplus as dividends to current stakeholders (in the form of addi-
tional pension beneﬁts or lower pension premia) or to save the surplus for
future participants.1 We explore the literature on the potential beneﬁts of this
intergenerational risk sharing and investigate under which conditions these
beneﬁts dominate the costs of the homogeneous decision rules that these pen-
sion schemes impose on heterogeneous participants. Financial intermediaries
like mutual funds and insurers offer individual plans and structured products
that are more tailor-made to the speciﬁc preferences and circumstances of an
individual but this customization typically involves additional costs. Insurers
and mutual funds, however, also execute and insure collective pension plans
based on compulsory participation, which involve risk sharing with future
generations but are typically not tailor-made to the individual.
1 Proﬁt participating contracts issued by insurers in many countries are in fact very closely
related (see Nordahl and Dokseland (2006)). In particular, new generations may ﬁnd these con-
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Pension schemes may smooth income not only across generations but also
within contemporaneous groups of participants through redistribution.2 To
illustrate, pension contracts usually charge uniform prices for deferred annu-
ities irrespective of the characteristics of individuals, such as sex and age (see
e.g. Brown (2002), and Aarssen and Kuipers (2006)). Especially uniform con-
tribution rates for deferred annuities with different deferral maturities tend to
imply substantial value redistribution across younger and older workers (see
e.g. Boeijen et al. (2006)). Redistribution of value can be analyzed by valu-
ing all relevant claims at market value (see e.g. Kortleve and Ponds (2006)).3
In this paper, we largely abstract from the task of redistribution. Rather than
ﬁnancial intermediaries, the government is often in a better position to redis-
tribute across individuals. The reason is that governments are endowed with
tax power over a larger pool of people: the nation as a whole. Collective pen-
sion schemes, in contrast, wield less effective tax power – even if all workers
in a sector are forced to participate in a sectoral scheme. The reason is that
labor-market mobility within a country is generally larger than labor mobility
between countries.
Our analysis also abstracts from the employer as a risk-bearing agent. The
implicit assumption is that the employer does not add to the risk-trading
opportunities on the capital market, for example by providing guaranteed
beneﬁts at a lower price than what is available in the market. Indeed, ﬁrms
increasingly mark-to-market the pension guarantees they provide to workers
because international accounting rules force companies to put their pension
risks on their balance sheets. Moreover, in trading risk with their employ-
ers, employees will be saddled with the credit risk of the company they work
for. This makes risk trading between employer and workers within a ﬁrm
less than optimal. Hence, employees trade risks on the capital markets and
between one another in collective pension schemes. A deﬁned-beneﬁt plan
thus buys guarantees either on the capital market or from young and future
participants rather than from the ﬁrm that employs the workers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up our bench-
mark framework for analyzing life-cycle ﬁnancial planning. Within this frame-
work, section 3 explores the optimal saving and investment behavior from
the perspective of the individual. This section abstracts from constraints on
intertemporal consumption smoothing and risk taking so that the resulting
allocation is ﬁrst best. Section 4 turns to various constraints on optimal
individual decision making due to imperfections in markets and individual
2 Risk sharing ex ante (i.e. before uncertainty is resolved) becomes redistribution ex post
(i.e. after uncertainty is resolved). We thus explore redistribution as the ex-post outcome of
an insurance of risk-sharing contract.
3 The analysis is this paper is crucially different because in these papers the assmption is
made that agents unwind the contribution and investment rules imposed by the pension fund.350 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
decision making. Collective pension schemes may help to relieve some of
these constraints on individual decision making and individual behavioral
biases but are also likely to introduce new types of constraints. Section
5 investigates the optimal design of collective pension schemes within our
benchmark framework, including risk sharing across generations through the
transfer of (possibly negative) surpluses over time. This section discusses when
and how compulsory pension plans can securitize human capital of current
and future participants. By thus allowing young generations and future gen-
erations to borrow against their human capital, these generations can partic-
ipate in risk taking and therefore take advantage of the equity risk premium.
Section 6 surveys the recent literature on various extensions to the benchmark
model: a more elaborate modelling of human capital, ﬁnancial and actuar-
ial risk factors, and preferences. Mathematical equations are kept to a min-
imum in the main text. Technical derivations are available in an appendix to
the working paper version of this paper (see Bovenberg et al. (2007)).
2 THE BENCHMARK MODEL
This section lays out our benchmark framework for exploring optimal life-
time saving and investment (see also Merton (1971), Merton and Samuelson
(1974); Teulings and de Vries (2006)). It describes our benchmark assump-
tions on ﬁnancial markets, labor markets and preferences and discusses the
parameter values employed in our numerical simulations.
2.1 Financial Markets
• A risk-free asset (a bond) is available.
• Equity-market risk is the only aggregate risk factor, which is traded through
equity. Housing is abstracted from.
• The interest rate, inﬂation, the volatility of equity, and the equity risk pre-
mium are constant over time so that mean reversion and stochastic volatil-
ity are absent. These prices are not affected by the decisions of individuals
or ﬁnancial intermediaries. We thus take a partial-equilibrium perspective
of a small open economy, which takes prices as given on the world market.
• Log stock returns are identically and independently distributed according
to a normal distribution.
• Financial markets are dynamically complete if households and pension
funds can continuously trade stocks and bonds without constraints. In
some cases, households and pension funds face constraints.SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 351
• Death is predictable or perfect insurance of individual longevity risk is
available. Aggregate longevity risk is thus absent.4
• Whenever we consider the presence of collective pension schemes we
assume that participants have access to the capital markets only through
their pension scheme. From the household’s perspective markets are thus
incomplete. Hence, individuals cannot offset the policies of their pension
scheme by engaging in offsetting capital-market transactions. Consumption
during the active period (i.e. when working) equals wage income minus the
pension premium. Consumption in retirement is given by the pension ben-
eﬁt.
2.2 Labor Markets
• The after-tax wage during the working career is constant and riskless with
a ﬁxed, exogenous retirement age.5 Human capital is thus paid out in the
form of constant wage income until it is fully depleted at the age of retire-
ment. Moreover, labor-market risks are absent.
• Labor supply is ﬁxed.
• Wages are exogenous: pension premia thus reduce disposable incomes one
for one.
2.3 Preferences
• Individuals aim to maximize lifetime utility, which is the weighted sum over
time of expected utility at each point in time. Utility at a point in time
depends only on consumption at that time. The weights of future expected
utilities decline exponentially at the so called rate of time preference. Hence,
people are impatient: at equal levels of consumption a marginal unit of
future consumption adds less to utility than current consumption
• Preferences feature positive and constant relative risk aversion.
Consumption in each contingency adds to utility. At larger levels of
consumption, however, additional consumption adds less to utility. The
negative elasticity of marginal utility with respect to the level of consump-
4 Even with ideosyncratic longevity risk but the absence of life insurance, the results below
survive if the length of individual life time is distributed exponentially (see Viceira (2001)).
5 We abstract from taxes on capital income. A constant rate of consumption tax reduces con-
sumption in each period and each contingency proportionally and will thus not affect saving
and investment decisions (except that all savings and investments are scaled back proportion-
ally). Such a consumption tax is equivalent to an income tax with a constant marginal rate
that treats pension saving on a so-called cash-ﬂow basis (i.e. premia are tax deductable while
beneﬁts are taxed) if the tax rate against which premia can be deducted is equal to the tax
rate at which the beneﬁts are taxed.352 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
tion is known as the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. This measure for
the sensitivity of marginal utility with respect to the level of consumption
is constant and thus does not depend on the consumption level.
Positive risk aversion implies that individuals have a taste for moderation
across time and across contingencies. They prefer a smooth consumption
level (with a low variance) rather than a highly volatile consumption
stream (with a high variance) over time or across contingencies. More
general models (than expected utility) distinguish the taste for moderation
across contingencies from the taste for moderation across time.R i s ka v e r -
sion measures the taste for moderation across random outcomes. Highly
risk-averse individuals feature a strong preference for stable consumption
levels across various contingencies. They want their consumption level to
be certain (’stable’) irrespective of what happens (which is reﬂected in the
costs of maintaining the consumption level in a particular contingency).
The taste for moderation across time is related to the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution. An individual exhibiting a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution prefers a stable level of consumption over time.
• Bequest motives are absent.
• Individuals start consuming when they enter the labor market.
2.4 Benchmark Parameters in Numerical Simulations
We illustrate our results with numerical simulations. Following Teulings and
de Vries (2006), these simulations are based on a constant coefﬁcient of risk
aversion of 5, a working life of 45 years, an expected retirement period of 15
years, a rate of time preference and a risk-free interest rate of 2% per year, an
equity risk premium of 4% a year, and a standard deviation of stock returns
of 20% per year.
3 SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE: THE FIRST BEST
3.1 Introduction
This section derives the ﬁrst-best solution to the ﬁnancial planning problem
of the investor under the assumptions as outlined in section 2. We analyze
this case in depth because it generates intuition and benchmark results for the
ﬁndings in more elaborate models. Section 3.2 explores consumption smooth-
ing (i.e. saving decisions) in the absence of risk. Section 3.3 investigates opti-
mal asset allocation in case of risky investment opportunities. Section 3.4
returns to optimal consumption smoothing but considers the case with risky
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3.2 Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing Without Risk
This section focuses on consumption smoothing over time in the absence of
risk. Together with the depreciation of human capital due to aging, the pref-
erence for a smooth consumption stream over time gives rise to a demand
for pension saving. Individuals want to move part of the income from their
human capital when they work to the periods in which they still would like to
consume even though they do not collect any labor income anymore. Capital
markets allow individuals to engage in intertemporal trade,6 with the inter-
est rate measuring the reward for transferring resources to a later date. In
particular, through capital markets, one can exchange resources in the active
periods of life, when labor resources are relatively abundant but consump-
tion is not so valuable at the margin, to the inactive periods of life when
consumption is relatively more valuable at the margin but labor resources
have already been depreciated. By investing pension premiums collected from
an active individual in ﬁnancial assets, ﬁnancial institutions (pension funds,
mutual funds, insurers) facilitate this intertemporal trade through capital mar-
kets. The ﬁnancial institution in effect transforms part of human capital of
the individual into a claim of that individual on that institution. These claims
are secured by ﬁnancial capital, which can be sold in retirement so that the
individual can maintain his standard of living.
3.2.1 Perfect Consumption Smoothing Without Impatience
The simplest case to consider is when the real interest rate is zero,7 indi-
viduals are not impatient (i.e. the rate of time preference is zero), and wage
income is constant during the active life. In that case, complete consumption
smoothing is optimal: consumption should remain constant during the life
cycle. The life-time budget constraint limits the level of consumption. Over-
all wealth, which consists of human and ﬁnancial wealth, measures lifetime
resources. The individual begins the working life without any ﬁnancial wealth
so that he relies on human wealth only. As the discounted value of life-time
wage income, human wealth at the beginning of the active life is simply the
number of active years times the annual wage income; labor income today is
equally valuable as labor income tomorrow because the real interest is zero.
The life-time budget constraint implies that the discounted value of con-
sumption (the sum of all consumption ﬂows during the life course in the case
of a zero discount rate) cannot exceed human wealth. A constant consump-
tion ﬂow equal to the share of the active life in the remaining life time times
the labor income ﬂow during the active life exactly exhausts human capital at
6 This trade is similar to trade in other markets except that goods at different dates are
exchanged.
7 Recall that risk is absent. Hence, this is the risk-free interest rate.354 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS





























Figure 1 – Expected consumption path (Ct) over the life-cycle if the real interest rate is zero
(r =0) and the individual is not impatient (ρ=0). Investment risk is absent
the end of life. The savings rate is thus equal to the share of retired life in the
overall adult life. Whereas human wealth is depleted at the rate of the labor
income ﬂow, overall wealth is depleted at a lower speed because part of the
labor income ﬂow is transformed into ﬁnancial wealth. At the age of retire-
ment, human capital is exhausted so that wealth consists of ﬁnancial wealth
only. Financial wealth is at its maximum at the retirement age after which it
is gradually depleted. However, since part of human capital is used for con-
sumption during the working career, total wealth is less at the retirement age
than at the start of the career: as a ratio of initial human wealth, ﬁnancial
wealth at retirement equals the share of the inactive life in the overall adult
life.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the consumption decision and its implications for
the trajectory of ﬁnancial, human and overall wealth. The solid line in Fig-
ure 1 illustrates that in this simplest case without risky investments the con-
sumption pattern is ﬂat and that a quarter of labor income is saved for retire-
ment. the dotted line refers to the case with risky investments and will be dis-
cussed in section 3.4. Figure 2 shows that overall wealth is depleted at three
quarters of the speed at which human capital is depreciated. At its maximum,
ﬁnancial wealth equals a quarter of initial human wealth. The ﬁgure indicates
that human wealth dominates ﬁnancial wealth (i.e. pension wealth) for most
part of the active working life. Labor markets thus play a key role in ﬁnancial
planning over the life cycle. Younger people are ceteris paribus wealthier than
older people because they have a longer expected life time in front of them
and have consumed less of their human capital.SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 355





















Figure 2 – Trajectories for ﬁnancial wealth (Ft), human wealth (Ht) and total wealth (Wt)o v e r
the life-cycle in the case with a zero real interest rate (r = 0) and without impatient individuals
(ρ=0) and risk
3.2.2 Perfect Consumption Smoothing with Impatience If the Real Rate
Equals the Time Preference
Individuals are typically impatient. This implies that individuals should be
rewarded for saving through positive interest rates. If the real interest rate
equals the rate of time preference, the individual still ﬁnds a constant con-
sumption stream optimal because the reward of waiting (i.e. the interest rate)
exactly balances the cost of waiting (i.e. the rate of time preference). Com-
pared to the case with a zero interest rate and a zero rate of time preferences,
the consumption level can be higher ceteris paribus because the pension saver
beneﬁts from positive net interest income on his accumulated savings.With
a positive interest rate, consumption is higher even although the present
value of human capital is lower at the beginning of life. The value of future
labor income declines because a positive interest rate indicates that a resource
earned tomorrow is worth less than a resource today. Hence, if the individual
would consume all his income today, he would be able to consume less com-
pared to the case with a zero interest rate. However, since the individual pre-
fers a stable consumption path over time, consumption occurs on average at a
later date than labor income is received. The individual thus enjoys a positive
income effect if the interest rate rises above zero.
Figure 3 involves the case in which the rate of time preference ρi equals
2% and the interest rate is 2%. Financial wealth at retirement is a larger share
of initial human wealth than in the case in which both the rate of time pref-
erence and the real interest rate are zero.356 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS


















Figure 3 – Trajectories for ﬁnancial wealth (Ft), human wealth (Ht) and total wealth (Wt)o v e r
the life cycle without risk and with an interest rate r and a rate of time preference ρ of 2%
3.2.3 Consumption Smoothing In The General Case, Excluding Risky
Investments
In the general case, the sign of the gap between the interest rate and the rate
of time preference determines whether consumption is increasing or decreas-
ing over time. With a positive gap, the beneﬁts from waiting offered in the
capital market exceed the subjective cost of waiting. Hence, the net reward for
waiting is positive. This positive reward makes a rising path for consumption





The growth rate of consumption
dci/dt
ci of individual i is not very sensitive
to the gap between the interest rate r and the individual’s rate of time pref-
erence ρi if a small intertemporal substitution elasticity of that individual
(1/φi) indicates that individual i exhibits a large preference for consumption
smoothing over time. Intuitively, behavior is not very sensitive to intertempo-
ral prices (i.e. the net reward for waiting) if agents dislike large differences
between consumption levels at different points in time. In that case, individ-
uals thus need to face substantial net rewards in order to be induced to have
a rising (and thus not smooth) consumption path over time.
8 The derivation of the equations in the text is outlined in the appendix to Bovenberg et al.
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Expression (1) implies that the optimal consumption level and the optimal
pension contribution depend on the parameters that describe the preferences
of the individual. Collective schemes that impose identical contribution rates
on participants that exhibit heterogeneous preferences thus cannot be opti-
mal. We will return to this issue in sections 4 and 5.
3.2.4 Shocks in Wealth and Consumption Smoothing
The rate at which overall wealth is consumed depends on age. Since older
people features a shorter planning horizon, they consume a larger share of
their overall wealth. If both a young and an old person get one additional
euro, the old person will consume the euro more rapidly. However, if both
agents obtain x% more wealth, both agents will increase their consumption
by x% during the rest of their lives.9 Intuitively, the preference for modera-
tion associated with the concave utility function implies that the agents want
to spread the increase in wealth as broadly over their life time as possible.
Hence, rather than spending it in a few periods, they choose to enjoy the
wealth boost in equal relative consumption increases in each period during








t stands for total wealth (i.e. the sum of human and ﬁnancial wealth)
of individual i at time t and Ci
s denotes consumption of that individ-
ual at time s. The unitary elasticity of the consumption ﬂow (in the rest
of the life time) with respect to wealth imply that both pension contribu-
tions should decline and pension beneﬁts increase following a positive wealth
shock. Hence, rather than a pension system that keeps the premium ﬁxed
(a deﬁned-contribution system) or a pension system that ﬁxes the beneﬁts (a
deﬁned-beneﬁt system), a hybrid system that adjusts both premia and beneﬁts
in response to income and wealth shocks appears to be optimal.
3.3 Risk Taking
Financial markets allow agents to shift consumption not only across time, but
also across various future contingencies when agents face uncertainty about
which contingency will actually materialize. In particular, risk-averse individu-
als can buy resources in bad states by giving up resources in good states. Just
as in the case of optimal consumption smoothing over time, we can distin-
guish between the preferences for consumption smoothing (across contingen-
9 This requires that the intertemporal elasticity of substution is ﬁxed over the life course,
which has been assumed in section 2.358 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
cies rather than time so that risk aversion rather than the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution measures this preference) and the prices for consumption
smoothing (in this case, instead of the net interest rate (r −ρi), the Sharpe
ratio, which is deﬁned as the expected excess return (over the risk-free return)
per standard deviation of the excess return, is relevant).10
How much risk the individual optimally chooses to absorb depends on
both risk aversion and the risk premium (for each unit of risk as measured
by the Sharpe ratio, which can be interpreted as the reward for risk taking).
The individual i chooses the optimal amount of risk in such a way that his
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (i.e. the negative elasticity of marginal util-
ity with respect to consumption), θi, equals the marginal rate of substitution






where ¯ µ and σ stand for the expectation and the standard deviation of the
excess return on the risk factor,11 while fi represents the individual i’s share




where λ≡¯ µ/σ denotes the Sharpe ratio so that the optimal expected excess
return due to risk taking amounts to fi ¯ µ=λ2/θi. Risk taking (i.e. volatility
of consumption across various contingencies) as measured by fiσ increases
with the reward to risk taking λ and decreases with the preference for con-
sumption smoothing (i.e. a certain consumption level independent of contin-
gencies) as measured by relative risk aversion θi. Note that fi can be larger
than unity. In that case, the worker should go short in bonds to buy the risk
factor. With our benchmark parameters, the Sharpe ratio λ and the standard
deviation σ are both 0.2 while relative risk aversion amounts to ﬁve. The opti-
mal investment share fi is thus 20%.
The expression for optimal consumption smoothing across contingencies
(4) is similar to that for optimal consumption smoothing across time (1). In
10 In complete capital markets, resources in each contingency have a single, unique price.
Capital markets are complete if the number of not perfectly correlated assets is equal to the
number of risk factors and these assets can be traded continuously. If agents can freely trade
in complete capital markets (as we assume in section 3), we can measure the utility value of
the property rights of individuals on resources by a single metric: wealth. In the presence of
constraints (as in Section 4), in contrast, individuals do not equate their marginal rates of
substitution (the ratios of their marginal utilities) to market prices. Hence, the market value
of assets do not fully describe the utility value of these resources.
11 Assume that the relative change in the risk factor (in excess of the risk-free return) is




. Then: ¯ µ≡ln(E risk factor )=µ+ 1
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both cases, the right-hand side involves the net price for smooth consump-
tion (i.e. the Sharpe ratio λ in the case of (4) and the net interest interest rate
(r −ρi) in the case of (1)) and the preference for consumption smoothing (i.e.
relative risk aversion θi in the case of (4) and the reciprocal inverse intertem-
poral substitution elasticity (1/φi) in the case of (1)). Prices and preferences
together determine the optimal inequality in consumption (across contingen-
cies as measured by fiσ or time as measured by the growth rate of consump-
tion) at the left-hand side of these expressions.
3.3.1 Optimal Investment Share Age Invariant
The share fi of total wealth invested in the risk factor does not depend on
age, or more generally, the investment horizon. Suppose that we invest for t
years rather than one year. In that case, both the excess return fi ¯ µt and the
variance of the excess return f 2
i σ2t in (3) vary proportionally with the length
of the investment period so that the optimal investment share is not affected
by the time horizon. In other words, both the marginal beneﬁts and the mar-
ginal costs of investing more in equity rise linearly with time.12 This reasoning
shows that the familiar argument that time diversiﬁcation allows young peo-
ple to take more risk is fallacious and relies on a wrong interpretation of the
law of large numbers. The sum of n independent and identically distributed
random variables has a variance that is n times larger than the variance of
each of the separate risks. The law of large numbers, in contrast, states that
the variance of the average (rather than the sum)o fn independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables goes to zero if n becomes very large.13
Mossin (1968), Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) ﬁrst independently
derived the result that the investment share in the risky asset is independent
of age, in contrast to the speed with which wealth is consumed. As we noted
in the subsection on consumption smoothing over time above, the elasticity
of consumption with respect to wealth is unity and thus independent of age.
Hence, a young person is equally vulnerable (in terms of the relative change in
the consumption ﬂow, which is relevant in case relative risk aversion is con-
stant) to the same relative change in wealth and should thus ceteris paribus
hold the same wealth share (as opposed to the absolute amount of wealth) in
12 This is the case with smooth preferences. Subsection 6.3.4 shows that if preferences are
characterized by loss aversion the costs of risky investment rise less rapidly with the horizon
than the beneﬁts do.
13 Another reasoning maintains that the beneﬁt of investing in equity is the excess return,
which increases linearly with the length of time, while the cost is the standard deviation of that
return, which rises only with the square root of that length because the drawings are indepen-
dent across time. With a smooth twice differentiable utility function, however, the costs of risk
are captured by the variance rather than the standard deviation. See also sub-section 6.3.4 on
loss aversion in which case the costs of risk are in fact closely related to the standard devia-
tion and thus rise less rapidly with the time horizon than the beneﬁts do.360 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
risk-bearing assets.14 If the investment share fi would depend on age, people
would bear more consumption risk in some parts of their lives than in oth-
ers. With constant relative risk aversion, this would generate opportunities for
more efﬁcient interpersonal allocation of risk.
3.3.2 Optimal Risk Sharing Across Individuals And Time
Optimal risk sharing when a shock hits implies that marginal utilities of con-
sumption in the remaining lives of all agents changes with the same percent-
age. The combination of optimal consumption smoothing (i.e. optimal saving,
see (2)) and optimal investment (see (4)) accomplishes exactly that. In par-
ticular, a standard deviation in the risk factor changes wealth by 100λ/θi%
(according to (4)) and thus (from (2)) also consumption during the rest of
the life of all living generations by that percentage. This yields a relative
change in marginal utility of consumption of 100λ%, which is the same for
all households. We thus see that (2) and (4) ensure that a shock is distributed
as broadly as possible over the currently living individuals. All these individu-
als are affected and they are affected during their entire remaining lives. Con-
sumption of these individuals behaves in the same fashion as the risk factor,
namely as a random walk.
3.3.3 Non-Tradable Human Wealth: The Investment Share Of Tradable
Financial Wealth
Human wealth is non tradable.15 Hence, ﬁnancial rather than human wealth
should be adjusted to achieve the right exposure to risk factors. If human
capital is riskless, it acts like a risk-free asset and all the exposure to risk
should come from ﬁnancial wealth. As the wealth share of ﬁnancial wealth
increases from zero to one during the working life, the share of ﬁnancial
wealth invested by individual i in risk-bearing assets, f ∗
i , falls from inﬁnity




































t denote, respectively, wealth invested in the risk factor,
ﬁnancial wealth, and human wealth at time t by individual i so that Wi
t =
14 This assumes that the young and the old person share the same relative risk aversion.
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) show that this requires that absolute risk tolerance is propor-
tional to wealth. If this is not the case, the wealthier young person does not feature the same
relative risk aversion as an older person who shares the same utility function and labor income
path over the life cycle. Fortunately, the possible non-proportionality of absolute risk tolerance
yields only a marginal effect on the optimal portfolio of young investors (see Gollier (2005)).
15 Other illiquid assets are owner-occupied housing and privately owned businesses. These
assets may have similar risk characteristics as equity.SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 361
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t . This ﬁnancial wealth share tends16 to fall for two reasons. First, the
absolute amount of wealth invested in equity (or risk-bearing assets) tends
to fall with time as an individual consumes part of human wealth during
the working life (so that Wt tends to decline with time). Second, the stock
of ﬁnancial wealth Ft tends to increase as the individual saves part of their
human capital. The economic intuition why the young should hold a larger
component of their ﬁnancial wealth in stocks is that the young are less depen-
dent on ﬁnancial wealth for their consumption because they have an alter-
native income source in the form of labor income. They thus can afford to
take more risk with ﬁnancial wealth than elderly agents who depend almost
entirely on this type of wealth for their livelihood.
3.3.4 Young Go Short to Acquire Optimal Risk Exposure
Equation (5) indicates that the optimal share of ﬁnancial wealth that is
invested in the risk factor can well be above one if ﬁnancial capital is small
and human capital substantial. This is typically the case early in the life cycle.
At the beginning of one’s career, one should thus borrow to acquire the risk-
bearing assets. On the basis of benchmark parameters, Teulings and de Vries
(2006) and Bodie et al. (1992) ﬁnd that a young worker may want to borrow
as much as six times his annual salary and invest this in the equity market.
Investment in housing ﬁnanced by mortgages can contribute to efﬁcient risk
bearing at younger ages if housing risk is correlated with equity risk.
Figure 4 illustrates the horizon dependence of the asset allocation of ﬁnan-
cial wealth. The solid line speciﬁes the expected fraction of ﬁnancial wealth
invested in equity over the life cycle. The dotted lines provide 10%- and 90%-
quantiles of the optimal fraction of ﬁnancial wealth that is invested in equity.
These quantiles indicate that, depending on the actual investment returns
experienced in the past, the optimal asset allocation can deviate from the a
priori expected allocation. Figure 4 shows that ﬁnancial wealth can get nega-
tive in which case the optimal exposure can be negative. It also presents the
optimal fraction of wealth that is invested in equity for two randomly selected
16 We use the word ’tends’ here because unexpectedly positive shocks may temporarily raise
ﬁnancial wealth so much that it offsets the depreciation of human capital. Conversely, adverse
shocks may cause ﬁnancial wealth to fall even though the individual saves part of his labor
income.
Another reason why the ratio Ht/Ft may not decline that steeply is that retired agents may
beneﬁt from a ﬁrst-pillar pension indexed to wages. In that case, a part of pension wealth is
like human capital so that also retirees rely to some extent on human capital.
Finally, especially high-skilled workers can experience rapid labor-income growth in the begin-
ning of their career. Hence, human capital may increase in the beginning of the career. At
the same time, ﬁnancial wealth remains small (and even become negative) as intertemporal
consumption smoothing gives rise to low saving rates. As human capital thus increases com-
pared to ﬁnancial wealth in the beginning of life, also the equity share in ﬁnancial wealth f ∗
increases (see Cocco et al. (2005)).362 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS

























































Figure 4 – Share of ﬁnancial wealth invested in risky assets ( f ∗
t ) over the life-cycle with the
benchmark parameters (r =2%,ρ =2%,λ =0.2)
scenarios. The same scenarios will be used in subsequent graphs to illustrate
the evolution of consumption and wealth. The scenario’s in ﬁgure 4 show that
the optimal equity share in ﬁnancial wealth is very volatile because ﬁnancial
wealth is very small early in the life cycle.
3.4 Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing with Risk
Section 3.2 explored optimal saving without risk. This subsection reconsid-
ers optimal saving behavior in the presence of risky investment opportunities
(see also ﬁgure 1, which compares consumption behavior in both the absence
and the presence of risk if agents are not impatient (i.e. ρi =0) and the real
interest rate is zero (i.e. r =0)). The introduction of risk affects optimal sav-
ing through two channels. First, risk taking enhances welfare because inves-
tors can now capture the equity premium. This positive income effect depends
on the risk premium fi ¯ µ and raises optimal consumption and reduces the
optimal pension premium (i.e. saving out of labor income). Intuitively, part
of retirement saving is ﬁnanced out of the risk premium. Second, risk tak-
ing introduces a precautionary saving motive. The sign of this motive depends
on whether marginal utility is convex (i.e. on the sign of the third derivative
of the utility function). In particular, risk implies an additional precaution-
ary saving motive if marginal utility is convex so that the expected marginal
utility of consumption (which determines the savings motive if the future
is uncertain) exceeds the marginal utility of expected consumption (which
determines the savings motive if the future is certain). Intuitively, transferringSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 363
resources to the future adds more to utility if the future becomes more uncer-
tain. If the third derivative of the utility function is positive, the consumer is
prudent (see Leland (1968)).
With a constant relative risk aversion, marginal utility is indeed convex
so that the investor is prudent. As a direct consequence, the introduction of
risk unambiguously increases the growth rate of expected consumption. With
a variance of ψ2
i = f 2
i σ2 on aggregate wealth, we derive for a CRRA utility
function (with φi =θi, which we impose for the rest of this section and sec-
tions 4 and 5) and the optimal investment share fi = λ
σθi that the expected













Hence, more risk ψi ceteris paribus raises the rate of time preference (or
the growth rate of labor income) that is required to ensure that expected
consumption is constant over the life cycle so that the expected pension pre-
mium is constant during the working life.18 With our benchmark parame-
ters the expected growth rate of consumption amounts to 0.48% per year. In
the present setting, the actual consumption and wealth trajectories can very
well deviate substantially from their expectation. Figures 5 and 6 present the
expectation, some quantiles and two scenario’s of the consumption path and
the corresponding wealth trajectories over the life-cycle.
3.4.1 Cohort Effects in Premium Rates
For individuals with the same preferences but different birth dates, the opti-
mal premium rate starts at the same level (Ft =0). Subsequently, the optimal
premium rates move parallel in response to shocks. This implies that individ-
uals of different cohorts pay different premium rates at the same age because
they have experienced different shocks. Figures 7 and 8 provide examples of
how consumption and ﬁnancial wealth are affected by shocks. At any point




i σ2. At the optimal investment share (4) this is given by λ2(θi−1)
2θi2 .
The ﬁrst term 1
2 fiµ represents the welfare gain (i.e. the Harberger triangle) from being able
to invest in risky assets. The second term (1+θi)
4 f 2
i σ2 stands for the impact of more precau-
tionary saving. This term is half of the corresponding term in the growth rate of consumption
(6) because the other half implies higher consumption at the end of the working life.
The equity risk premium does not directly raise the growth rate of consumption. This is
because at the margin the beneﬁt of the risk premium is exactly offset by the cost of risk
if the investment share is optimal.
18 With the optimal investment share fi from (4), we have ψ = fi ¯ µ=λ2/θi so that ρi =
r + (1+θi)λ2
2θi −θigi (where gi is the growth rate of wage income) implies that the premium
rate does not depend on age. Note that we have assumed in section 2 that gi =0.364 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS

























Figure 5 – Expectation, 10% and 90% quantiles and two simulated scenario paths of the con-
sumption path (Ct) over the life cycle for the benchmark parameters (r =2%,ρ =2%,λ =0.2)






























Figure 6 – Expectation, 10% and 90% quantiles and two simulated scenario paths of the ﬁnan-
cial wealth path (Ft) over the lifecycle for the benchmark parameters (r =2%,ρ =2%,λ =0.2)
in time, generations of different ages pay different premium rates even if the
expected premium rates are constant over the working life (i.e. the right-hand
side of (6) is zero). To illustrate, a generation that started to work at t =1
participates in the risks that materialized between t =1a n dt =31. A youn-SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 365























Individual entering at time t=1
Individual entering at time t=31
Individual entering at time t=1 without shocks
Individual entering at time t=31 without shocks
Figure 7 – Trajectories of the consumption paths (Ct) of individuals entering at respectively time
t = 1 and t = 31. Shocks in the asset price are absent except at time t = 20 and t = 40, when
a negative shock is imposed. All trajectories correspond to the benchmark parameters (r =2%,
ρ=2%,λ =0.2)
Individual entering at time t=1
Individual entering at time t=30
Individual entering at time t=1 without shocks
Individual entering at time t=30 without shocks


















Figure 8 – Trajectories of the ﬁnancial wealth paths (Ft) of individuals entering at respectively
time t =1 and t =31. Shocks in the asset price are absent except at time t =20 and t =40, when
a negative shock is imposed. All trajectories correspond to the benchmark parameters (r =2%,
ρ=2%,λ =0.2)366 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
ger generation who enters the labor market at t =31, in contrast, does not.
The negative shock in the ﬁnancial market exerts a proportional effect on
consumption while the ﬁnancial wealth of the younger generation is reduced
by more (in absolute value) than that of the older generation.
4 SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE WITH CONSTRAINTS
4.1 Introduction
The ﬁrst-best contribution and asset allocation strategies derived in the
previous section require that individuals can borrow against their human cap-
ital. Moreover, individuals must be able to implement rather complicated sav-
ing and investment strategies that depend on age and the level of ﬁnancial
wealth. This section investigates how constraints faced by individual inves-
tors affect their strategies and welfare levels. In particular, after Subsection
4.2 considers the implications of annuities, Subsection 4.3 analyzes what hap-
pens if agents can not borrow against their human capital. Subsection 4.4
explores the implications of constant contribution rates and asset allocations.
Subsection 4.5 analyzes the impact of other behavioral limitations to indi-
vidual decision making, including possible underdiversiﬁcation and infrequent
rebalancing.
4.2 Annuities
To protect themselves against individual longevity risk, individual agents can
buy annuities at retirement. Standard annuities typically do not allow taking
investment risk during retirement. Individuals thus fail to exploit their risk-
bearing capacity for shocks that occur after retirement. The risk exposure of
retired individuals is too small: they use an implicit Sharpe ratio of zero (or
an inﬁnite implicit relative risk aversion). Shocks are thus absorbed only dur-
ing working life. All capital is risk bearing as regards the shocks that occur
during the working life. We ﬁnd that the wrong risk exposure of the retired
generation yields a welfare loss of 0.5% of ex-ante life-time utility in terms of
certainty equivalent consumption.19 The utility loss is small20 because of two
reasons. First, shocks that occur during the retirement period are discounted
heavily (since they occur late in life). Second, these shocks affect only a small
part of overall wealth: most wealth has already been depleted at the time of
retirement. In other words, the shocks during retirement can be smoothed
19 We measure welfare levels by the constant, certain consumption level that achieves the
same utility level as the various stochastic consumption streams.
20 The losses are larger if we measure them compared to the certainty equivalent consump-
tion that remains at the time of retirement (see Koijen et al. (2006a)).SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 367
only over a relatively short time period as the remaining life is relatively short.
The rest of this section assumes annuities so that retired agents do not take
investment risk.
4.3 Borrowing Constraints
As discussed in section 3.3, the ﬁrst-best asset allocation implies that one
should borrow at the beginning of one’s career and invest the proceeds in
the stock market to acquire sufﬁcient exposure to the equity market. Adverse
selection and moral hazard, however, typically preclude borrowing against
future labor income. Financial institutions cannot use human capital as a col-
lateral to ensure that the loan is paid back.21 This subsection therefore con-
siders the more realistic case with an exogenous22 borrowing constraint so
that equity exposure cannot exceed unity (i.e. f ∗
it≤1). With these constraints,
agents must get all their risk exposure from positive ﬁnancial capital. Hence,
in contrast to older workers who can accumulate substantial ﬁnancial capi-
tal through saving, young workers cannot get enough exposure to risk.23 The
restricted access of younger workers to capital markets that is implied by the
borrowing constraint harms their welfare and thus functions like an implicit
tax on wealth. This negative income effects reduces consumption and thus
boosts saving initially. Another reason why borrowing constraints raise saving
is that additional saving allows the young worker to acquire more access to
equity markets so that they can take more advantage of the equity premium.
In case of borrowing constraints, the optimal contribution rates and asset
allocations can no longer be determined analytically so that we must rely on
numerical simulations (see e.g. Koijen et al. (2007)). These numerical simu-
lations assume that agents can trade only at an annual frequency. The transi-
tion from continuous to discrete trading (at annual frequency) yields a welfare
loss of 0.8% of certainty-equivalent consumption.
The presence of the borrowing constraints implies an additional welfare
loss of approximately 2.8% of certainty equivalent consumption. This welfare
loss associated with borrowing constraints is thus substantially larger than the
welfare loss due to annuities. At the beginning of life, limits on risk expo-
21 In principle investments in derivatives with extreme exposures (such as far out of the
money call options) can be used to obtain adequate equity market exposure with small mon-
etary investments only. However, very far out of the money derivatives are not traded in liq-
uid markets. If the real estate market and the equity market are correlated, strategies based
on investments in real estate ﬁnanced by mortgages can be used as an alternative strategy to
build substantial equity exposure even though investors do not own much ﬁnancial wealth.
22 Cocco et al. (2005) show that exogenous borrowing constraints can be viewed as approx-
imations to endogenous borrowing constraints derived from recent literature on endogenous
credit-market imperfections.
23 See also Constantinides et al. (2002).368 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS





























Expected consumption level unconstrained
Expected consumption level constrained
Figure 9 – Expected consumption level Ct under the benchmark parameters (r = ρ = 2%,
λ=0.2) in the absence and in the presence of borrowing constraints
sure are more costly than at the end of life because at the beginning of life
shocks can be smoothed out over a relatively long time period. The risk-bear-
ing capacity of the young is particularly valuable also because shocks that are
absorbed when young are not discounted much.
For our benchmark case, the quantiles of the optimal solutions with bor-
rowing constraints are presented in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9 presents the
optimal consumption path. A comparison with the solid line in Figure 5
(which is added to Figure 9 for ease of reference) illustrates that the restricted
access of younger workers reduces consumption levels and raises saving.
To put the welfare loss of borrowing constraints and other constraints into
perspective, we compute the welfare costs of taking no risks at all during the
life cycle. This is the most extreme form of limits on risk sharing. Individu-
als in effect do not have any risk-bearing capital at all. Teulings and de Vries
(2006) compute the following approximation for the welfare loss (in terms of
the relative decline in certainty equivalent consumption) associated with this





The intuition behind this expression is that the average duration of risky
investments is half the lifetime D and that the welfare loss for a year risklessSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 369


























































Figure 10 – Expectation of the optimal equity share in ﬁnancial wealth f ∗
t over the life cycle
in the presence of a borrowing constraint case under the benchmark parameters (r = ρ = 2%,
λ=0.2)
investment is given by half of the potential reward for risk24 1
2 fi ¯ µ= 1
2
λ2
θi .T h e
welfare loss thus rises with the reward to risk taking (i.e. the Sharpe ratio λ)
and declines with the willingness to do so (i.e. relative risk aversion θi). With
our benchmark parameters, this approximation yields a welfare loss of 12%
(in terms of certainty equivalent consumption).
4.4 Time-Invariant Pension Premium and Asset Allocation
The savings and investment decisions require substantial investor sophistica-
tion. This section considers the welfare losses imposed by a number of sim-
pler strategies in the case with borrowing constraints.
4.4.1 Deﬁned Contribution
The ﬁrst strategy we consider is a standard deﬁned contribution (DC) solu-
tion where the premium rate is ﬁxed independently of age or wealth. The
level of this premium rate is determined optimally and the asset allocation
optimally varies with age and shocks to ﬁnancial wealth. For the benchmark
parameters, the optimal consumption rate is 87% of labor income.
If the contribution rate is ﬁxed ap r i o r iand does not respond to shocks,
the part of wealth that is dedicated to pre-retirement consumption does
not contribute to risk sharing. Only the part of wealth that is dedicated
24 Only half of the reward to risk is actually a welfare gain. The reason is that the indi-
vidual also bears additional risk, which harms welfare. In fact, one can interpret the welfare
loss as a Harberger triangle due to a tax on risk taking. The tax on risk taking is given by
¯ µ (since the reward for taking risk is taken away), while the behavioral response (as a share
of overall wealth) is given by fi. The Harberger triangle is thus given by 1
2 fi ¯ µ.370 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
to post-retirement consumption is exposed to shocks, which implies that
risk exposure is not optimal and that the individual does not fully take
advantage of the risk premium. The elasticities of consumption with respect
to wealth shocks indicate inefﬁcient consumption smoothing. Indeed, con-
sumption during the working life does not react to wealth shocks at all.
The welfare loss of this individual DC plan is 3% (in certainty equiva-
lent consumption) relative to the optimal individual plan (with borrowing
constraints, annuities and discrete trading) in Subsection 4.3. Compared to
the ﬁrst best in section 3, the welfare loss is thus a little more than 7%
(in certainty equivalent consumption) because the optimal individual scheme
yields a welfare loss of 4.1% relative to the ﬁrst best (0.5% due to annu-
ities, 0.8% due to discrete trading, and 2.8% due to borrowing constraints).
This welfare loss of 7% can be compared to the case when the individ-
ual is entirely precluded from investing in equity (and not just as regards
the part of wealth that is dedicated to post-retirement consumption) but
sets an optimal age dependent contribution rate. This welfare loss is 8.5%.
The welfare losses of the constraint that the DC plan imposes on risk tak-
ing before retirement is particularly large if a small coefﬁcient of risk aver-
sion (and a large Sharpe ratio) indicates that young workers would like
to have taken risk on their human wealth dedicated to before-retirement
consumption.
Just as in the optimal individual system (see Figure 10), in the DC system
the share of ﬁnancial wealth invested in equity declines during the work-
ing life. The reason is that pension wealth (i.e. the discounted value of con-
tributions) is gradually transformed into ﬁnancial wealth so that ﬁnancial
wealth tends to increase during the working life. With suboptimal consump-
tion smoothing under the DC system, however, the absolute amount of equity
at the beginning of life is substantially smaller as pension wealth (i.e. the dis-
counted value of the ﬁxed pension contributions, which are equal to the dis-
counted value of retirement consumption) is significantly smaller than human
capital (i.e. the discounted value of wages, which is equal to discounted con-
sumption during not only retirement but also the working life). Indeed, a
pension system that excludes part of life-time consumption from absorbing
risks limits the risk-bearing capacity of individuals.25
25 For that same reason, deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) systems, which ﬁx the retirement beneﬁt, limit
the the risk-bearing capacity of individuals. Compared to DC systems, they damage the risk-
bearing capacities of old agents relatively more. Indeed, compared to DC systems, DB schemes
start to constrain the risk-bearing capacity of individuals more at the age at which the value
of pension wealth (the discounted value of retirement consumption) starts to exceed the dis-
counted value of consumption during the remaining working life). The larger is the working
life compared to the inactive life, the larger are the welfare losses from a DC scheme com-
pared to those of a DB scheme.SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 371


























Figure 11 – Welfare loss due to suboptimal constant saving rates. The asset allocation is
optimally adjusted given the constant saving rates
Figure 11 indicates how the welfare losses on account of deﬁned-contri-
bution systems depend on the selection of the optimal contribution rate. The
optimal pension contribution is 13% (corresponding to a savings rate of 87%)
If the savings rate during the working life is set 7%-points too high (at a con-
sumption rate of 80%) an additional welfare loss approximately of 4.5% (in
terms of certainty equivalent consumption) is incurred.
4.4.2 Fixed Equity Share of Financial Wealth
The ﬁnancial planning of the investor can be simpliﬁed also by imposing a
constant portfolio allocation in ﬁnancial wealth. Figure 12 shows how the
welfare level varies with the constant portfolio allocation. An equity share
of 53% of ﬁnancial wealth minimizes the welfare loss from a ﬁxed portfo-
lio allocation. The welfare loss is 1.7% compared to the optimal strategy of
an individual facing borrowing constraints. This loss is smaller than the costs
of borrowing constraints. This again reveals that constraints on risk taking
are especially large at the beginning of life when the individual is especially
wealthy.
If we set not only a constant asset allocation but also a constant contri-
bution rate, the optimal share of ﬁnancial wealth invested in equity declines
to 30%. The reason is that individuals no longer employ consumption when
working as a risk absorber so that they can afford to take on only a limited
amount of risk. The welfare loss in this case relative to the DC case where
the asset allocation was optimized dependent on age and wealth is only 0.4%.
The welfare loss is relatively small because large risk taking in the beginning
of life is no longer optimal if young consumption cannot adjust to shocks. A
constant asset allocation through life is thus less costly.372 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
























Figure 12 – Welfare loss due to suboptimal constant portfolio choice (i.e. equity as share of
ﬁnancial wealth). The savings rate is adjusted optimally given the constraints on the portfolio
choice
4.5 The Ability of Individuals to Choose their Optimal Pension Contract
Section 3 considered the ﬁrst-best life-time ﬁnancial plan and Subsection 4.3
explored the optimal individual contract in case of borrowing constraints. In
both cases, we assumed that the contract was optimally tuned to the pref-
erences of the individual. Subsection 4.4 analyzed how robust the optimal
solution is to the use of static rather than dynamic contribution rules and
asset allocation strategies. This analysis suggests that the individuals suffer
substantial welfare losses if they lack the expertise to select and implement
optimal savings and investment strategies during their life time. As a direct
consequence, adequate ﬁnancial advice and access to the structured prod-
ucts offered by ﬁnancial intermediaries are quite valuable in order to help
individuals with their life-cycle ﬁnancial planning. A large literature on how
individuals actually decide on saving and investment over their life time has
developed recently. This subsection provides a short introduction to this liter-
ature.
Individuals spend little time and effort on planning for retirement. Van
Rooij et al. (2007) ﬁnd that individuals in the Netherlands are not interested
in pension related issues and think they are not able to take pension related
decisions. Lusardi (1999) reports that even in the US, where individuals have
many more pension related decisions to make, one-third of the workers had
“hardly thought about retirement” only ten years before retirement. Ameriks
et al. (2003) reports, also for the US, that more than 50% of a sample of
highly educated wealthy individuals had “not spent a great deal of time devel-
oping a ﬁnancial plan”. Lack of planning has serious consequences: those
who do not plan have lower wealth holdings and are less likely to report that
they experience a satisfying retirement. There are many recent papers thatSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 373
analyze the impact of improved information (e.g. through beneﬁt informa-
tion fairs) and ﬁnancial education (see e.g. Venti (2006); Clark et al. (2006).
At best, the results indicate small improvements in the effort spent on pen-
sion related decisions and on the quality of these decisions. Choi et al. (2005)
report that tax-incentives for retirement saving were not utilized, even after
they had been explicitly pointed out in ﬁnancial training courses.
Individuals selecting their pension contract face two decisions: how much
to save and how to invest the ﬁnancial wealth that is accumulated. The
existing evidence, which is primarily on the US, indicates that individuals
undersave and that they experience unanticipated drops in consumption at
retirement. Moreover a number of surveys have found that the vast majority
of individuals thinks that they should be saving more for retirement (Laib-
son et al. (1998); Choi et al. (2002)). One explanation that is well docu-
mented in psychology is that people lack the self control that is required to
implement a savings plan. People want to save for the future but they lack
the capacity to carry out their intention. A convenient way to model actual
behavior is hyperbolic discounting. This model assumes that nearby discount
rates are much larger than long-term discount rates. As a consequence, con-
sumers exhibit time-inconsistent behavior while actual behavior diverges from
planned behavior.
With respect to the asset allocation, an even more extensive literature indi-
cates that individuals seem to make significant mistakes. Many households
take decisions that are difﬁcult to reconcile with the advice given to them by
ﬁnancial planners or other experts. Of course it could be that investors behave
optimally but should be characterized by non-standard preferences such as
loss aversion or habit formation. These extensions of the basic model will be
discussed in section 6. This section takes the standard preference speciﬁcation
introduced in section 2 as starting point and interprets deviations in observed
behaviour as investment mistakes.
A well-established stylized fact in the literature is that only a small part
of the population in countries like Italy (Guiso and Japelli (2005)) or the US
(Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)) hold stocks, directly or indirectly. Participants
in retirement saving plans rarely rebalance their portfolio or alter the alloca-
tion of their contributions over the life cycle (Ameriks and Zeldes (2004)).
Many households do not diversify and hold only a few stocks, often with
a local bias and in 401(k) schemes often even with a bias to the stock of
their own employer (Huberman (2001); Mitchell and Utkus (2003); Munnel
and Sunden (2004)). Participants in 401(k) plans display a tendency to split
their contributions evenly among investment options, irrespective of the type
of options that is offered (Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). Such a “1/n”-rule of
thumb is clearly at odds with optimal diversiﬁcation and adequate risk tak-
ing. Financial education could play a role. Campbell (2006) reports that more374 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
educated households in Sweden diversify their portfolio more efﬁciently than
less educated households do.
The overwhelming evidence that individuals have difﬁculties in taking ade-
quate savings and investments decisions raises the question how to address
this problem (see also Kooreman and Prast (2007)). One option is to force
mandatory participation in a collective scheme where decisions are taken by
professionals. One of the main drawbacks (see also section 5) is that collec-
tive schemes typically do not take into account individual characteristics and
preferences. Moreover, important decisions in these schemes are usually taken
by pension fund trustees and the evidence on the competence of trustees sug-
gests at least that it is heterogeneous (Clark et al. (2006)). Another option
is to provide adequate ﬁnancial advice and to develop innovative products
that stimulate individuals to take adequate pension related decisions. A well
known example is the “Save More Tomorrow” plan proposed by Thaler and
Benartzi (2004). The commitment mechanism allows individuals to commit to
increasing their savings rate at some later date. Other examples include the
use of automatic enrollment in savings plans, automatic payroll deduction in
employer-based plans and the use of adequate defaults with respect to savings
rates and asset allocation. Yet another example is the use of peer effects by
setting up beneﬁts information fairs for some workers, which has been shown
to have an impact also on the saving behavior of colleagues that had not been
invited to attend (Duﬂo and Saez (2003)). No doubt in the years to come
many other structured plans and products will be developed that aim to facil-
itate individual decision making.
Figure 13 illustrate the potential costs of sub-optimal individual behavior
due to behavioral biases. In particular, this Figure contains the welfare losses
if an individual adopts wrong risk aversion and time-preference parameters
when selecting structured products to implement the optimal investment and
saving decisions in individual plans (i.e. with borrowing constraints and annu-
ities) derived in Subsection 4.3. Figure 13 is based on the assumption that
product that is offered is based on a risk aversion of 5% and a time preference
parameter of 2%. The costs of inadequate ﬁnancial advise, i.e. of adopt-
ing strategies that are optimal for individuals with other preference param-
eters can be substantial. The costs of the inadequate assumptions on risk
preferences26 are particularly large if the individual turns out to have a time
preference that substantially exceeds the time preference on which the ﬁnan-
cial plan is based. The welfare loss can be as large 4.0% (in terms of certainty
equivalent consumption) for a risk preference of 4% rather 2% and even sub-
26 With a CRRA utility function, a wrong risk aversion parameter implies that also the
intertemporal substitution elasticity is not adequate. Hence, it distorts both risk taking and
















Figure 13 – Welfare costs of suboptimal individal behavior due to incorrect risk aversion and/or
time preference assumptions

























Figure 14 – Welfare costs of idisynchratic risk taking
stantially larger for more extreme deviations between the assumed and actual
preference parameters.
In the result so far we assumed that agents hold optimally diversiﬁed port-
folios when taking equity exposure. In reality individuals will often hold a few
stocks only which implies that idiosynchratic risk is taken that does not gen-
erate an equity premium. Figure 14 illustrates the welfare costs of carrying id-
iosynchratic risk. If both the level of systematic and idiosynchratic risk equals
20% the over-all volatility of the equity investment is 28.2% with an associ-
ated 3.5% welfare loss relative to an optimally diversiﬁed equity portfolio with
a 20% volatility
5 COLLECTIVE PENSION SCHEMES
5.1 Introduction
Sections 3 and 4 considered the optimal individual pension contract in
the ﬁrst-best case as well as under a number of more realistic constraints.376 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
This section turns to the cost and beneﬁts of mandatory, collective pension
schemes.
A number of arguments have been put forward as advantages collective
pension schemes:
(i) Collective pension schemes enable young participants to alleviate borrow-
ing constraints
(ii) Collective pension schemes are cost efﬁcient
(iii) Collective pension schemes enable risk sharing between non-overlapping
generations
(iv) Collective pension schemes complete markets by arranging trades of
assets that are not traded on ﬁnancial markets
(v) Collective pension funds take over decisions of boundedly rational partic-
ipants
Other arguments can be put forward as disadvantages of collective pension
schemes:
(i) Collective pension schemes are not tailor made to the characteristics of
the individual
(ii) Collective pension schemes impose uniform contribution rates and asset
allocations on heterogeneous participants
(iii) Collective pension schemes involve suboptimal consumption smoothing
as shocks are not spread out over the remaining life time
(iv) Collective pension contracts are incomplete and not transparent
(v) Collective pension funds reduce competition between funds
The ﬁrst argument implies that collective pension schemes allow individu-
als to implement their optimal saving and investment plans in a more optimal
way than individual pension contracts. The reason is that compulsory partici-
pation in collective pension schemes combat adverse selection and moral haz-
ard if young workers borrow against the unsecured collateral of their human
capital. The second argument in favor of collective schemes is that their costs
are usually lower than the costs associated with individual pension schemes.
In particular, collective schemes avoid time consuming search incurred by
individuals and marketing cost by ﬁnancial intermediaries. Subsection 5.2
elaborates on the ﬁrst two arguments in favor of collective schemes.
Mandatory collective pension schemes also allow risks to be shared with
future generations, i.e. generations that do not yet participate in the labor
market at the time a shock materializes. Subsection 5.3 shows that the ben-
eﬁts of additional intergenerational risk sharing are potentially substantial if
all generations are committed to the contract; in this case, we can abstract
from the so-called discontinuity risk that generations entering the labor mar-
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subsection considers also the welfare gains of intergenerational risk sharing
in case the potential losses for newly entering generations in case of adverse
shocks are limited through dynamic asset allocation strategies.
An important drawback of collective pension schemes is that they are not
tailor made to the preferences or speciﬁc circumstances of each individual. As
discussed in Subsection 4.5, the use of the wrong preference parameters gen-
erates a substantial welfare loss compared to the case in which the individ-
ual could have optimally implemented a pension contract with the adequate
speciﬁcations. Indeed, individual characteristics such as the presence of part-
ner pension or non-pension wealth are typically not taken into account in col-
lective pension schemes.27 Subsection 5.4 explores the welfare losses due to
uniform pension contracts that are not tailor-made to individual features.
Subsection 5.5 explores the implications of the collective pension contracts
that are implemented in practice for welfare, consumption smoothing and
individual risk exposures. The advantages of these schemes are that they allow
for risk sharing with future generations and that they allow young agents
facing borrowing constraints to acquire substantial exposure to equity risk.
The disadvantage is that these schemes involve suboptimal intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing as shocks are not spread out over the remaining life
time. Moreover, the risk exposures of participants are not optimal as they
depend the funding rate of the scheme as a whole rather than on the wealth
position of the individual.
Collective pension schemes have other advantages and disadvantages that
we do not explore further in this section. In the benchmark model, the single
ﬁnancial risk factor is the only risk factor and this risk factor is traded in fric-
tionless markets. In more realistic economies, also other risk factors that can
not easily be traded in capital markets (such as price inﬂation, wage inﬂation
and longevity) are important. A potentially important advantage of collective
pension schemes is that risks that can not be traded in capital markets can be
shared through the pension contract. In incomplete ﬁnancial markets, pension
contracts may create new, non-tradable ﬁnancial assets that can enhance efﬁ-
cient risk sharing.
This section assumes that collective pension contracts are complete, i.e. all
pay-offs in future contingencies are set in advance. In reality, however, many
collective pension contracts are incomplete and the property rights on the sur-
plus of the pension fund are often unclear. In particular, the board of the
pension scheme has the discretion to pay out the surplus as dividends to cur-
rent stakeholders (in the form of additional pension beneﬁts or additional
future beneﬁt claims that are not fully covered by additional premia) or to
27 Also individual differences in the ability to postpone retirement or in life expectancy (e.g
due to socioeconomic characteristics) are important determinants of optimal individual pension
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save the surplus for future participants. This discretionary power of the trust-
ees has the advantage that all the possible contingencies do not have to be
thought through ex ante, thereby reducing transaction costs. A disadvantage
is that the collective decision making within the board of the scheme may give
rise to political risks and less secure individual property rights, thereby harm-
ing the welfare of risk-averse participants. Indeed, budget constraints apply to
the pension scheme as a whole rather than to individual participants. Hence,
a collective pension scheme can redistribute market value across generations
as participants do not hold tradable individual property rights on the pension
fund. Rather, they have non-tradable claims on the pension scheme when they
work in the sector or have accumulated pension rights in that sector. These
claims are not necessarily matched with tradable ﬁnancial assets owned by the
pension scheme. Moreover, the market-value of these claims may be affected
by the discretionary decisions by the board of the pension scheme (see Hoeve-
naars and Ponds (2006)). Indeed, the pension fund is an independent legal
entity, which has the discretionary power to shift resources between genera-
tions.
5.2 Borrowing Constraints and Cost Efﬁciency
As discussed in section 3.3, the ﬁrst-best asset allocation implies that one
should borrow at the beginning of one’s career and invest the proceeds in
the stock market to acquire sufﬁcient exposure to the equity market. As dis-
cussed in section 4.3, when trying to implement the ﬁrst-best solution derived
in section 3.3, young workers typically face borrowing constraints. The reason
is that the lender faces substantial credit risk on an unsecured loan due to
adverse selection and moral hazard. Indeed, if the stock market crashes, the
lender does not have collateral. Compulsory participation in collective pen-
sion schemes can alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard when young
workers borrow against their human capital to invest in equity. In effect, man-
datory participation helps to secure the human capital of younger generation
as a collateral, thereby limiting bankruptcy risk and thus relaxing the credit
constraints faced by young generations. A collective deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
fund that carries mismatch risk by investing in equity can be viewed as youn-
ger participants issuing risk-free debt to the older generations and using the
borrowed funds to invest in the equity market. Indeed, the mismatch risk of
the pension scheme is born by the younger generations in the form of vola-
tile recovery premia. In fact, the risky pension contribution allows the young
to transform their riskless human capital in a risk-bearing asset. In this way,
they acquire the optimal exposure to equity risk (see Beetsma and Bovenberg
(2007)). Section 4.3 reported that for the benchmark parameters the welfare
gains of being able to completely avoid the borrowing constraints are 2.8% of
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TABLE 1 – WELFARE LOSSES DUE TO ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
RELATIVE TO FRICTIONLESS FIRST-BEST SOLUTION (from section 3)
Annual implementation costs (%)
0% 0.3% 0.5% 1.0%
First best 0% −1.2% −2.0% −4.0%
rule of thumb 0% −1.6% −2.8% −5.6%
constrained −3.6% −4.6% −5.3% −7.0%
Relieving the borrowing constraints through compulsory participation is
not costless if, in contrast to our benchmark model, labor supply in the sec-
tor to which the compulsory participation applies is endogenous. In that case,
mandatory participation gives rise to labor-market distortions. In particu-
lar, agents reduce their labor supply to the sector if adverse developments in
equity markets saddle them with negative pension wealth (i.e. pension debt)
that they have to ﬁnance with recovery premia on basis of their labor sup-
ply. Sectoral labor supply can be reduced by moving to other sectors or
countries, by becoming self-employed, by working part-time or by retiring
early.
Mandatory collective pension schemes allow cost-effective pension solu-
tions because of economies of scale as well as lower marketing and search
costs. Bikker and De Dreu (2006) report a cost average of 0.30% per annum
for medium sized and large collective pension schemes, whereas mutual funds
and insurers typically charge 0.80–1.00% per annum or more for individual
plans (see e.g. Poterba et al. (2005)). So far, we have ignored implementa-
tion costs. Table 1 computes the welfare losses (in terms of certainty equiv-
alent consumption) of the various costly pension deals relative to the case in
which implementation costs are negligible. In order to derive the welfare loss
of implementation costs, the annual return on both riskless and risky assets
is decreased by the annual implementation costs. The welfare costs (in per-
centage changes of certainty equivalent consumption) associated with a ﬁxed





where T stands for the length of the working period so that D − T equals
the length of the retirement period. Note that in the constrained case both
borrowing constraints and inadequate risk taking after retirement due to an
insufﬁciently rich annuity menu are taken into account.380 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
5.3 Risk Taking Before Working
Section 3 considered the optimal pension contract for an individual who
enters adult life, i.e. enters the labor market and starts to consume out of hsis
own labor income. As shown by Teulings and de Vries (2006), this contract
can be improved further if we allow for the possibility that agents assume
ﬁnancial risks already before they are adults. Indeed, an individual is already
endowed with human capital at birth and can in theory then already partici-
pate in stock-market risks by borrowing against his human capital to invest in
the stock market. Teulings and de Vries (2006) demonstrate that the potential
welfare beneﬁts of participation in the stock market before entering the labor
force are substantial.
Teenagers and babies do not usually directly invest in equity markets.
However, compulsory pension schemes allow them to participate in the stock
market in an indirect way. Collective pension schemes share risks with gener-
ations that do not yet participate in the scheme by transferring buffers (which
may be negative) from current participants to future generations. A buffer
can be deﬁned as the assets in the scheme minus the assets of the genera-
tions that have already started to work and pay pension premiums. A buffer
thus corresponds to the aggregate ﬁnancial wealth of future workers. These
workers have in fact borrowed to buy stocks, thereby participating in stock
market risks even before they start to work (see also Beetsma and Bovenberg
(2007)). In particular, collective pension schemes typically levy equal contri-
butions on all active generations at a particular point in time with the level
of the uniform contribution depending on the funding rate of the collective
scheme. In this way, the premium cohorts pay when they enter the scheme
depends on the investment history of the scheme before they entered and thus
on the shocks that materialized before they started to work.
Through the transfer of buffers between generations a collective pension
scheme in fact helps to complete capital markets by allowing younger gener-
ations (and even unborn generations) to buy risk-bearing assets. In decentral-
ized capital markets, individuals can obviously buy risk-bearing assets only
after they have been born. They are thus not able to trade risks that occur
before they are born. In other words, decentralized capital markets allow only
overlapping generations (i.e. generations that are in the market at the same
time) to trade risks that emerge during the rest of their life times. Risk shar-
ing among non-overlapping generations thus has to occur through other insti-
tutions, such as compulsory pension schemes but also tax and public debt
policy.
It is theoretically optimal to diversify risk over as many generations and
as many time periods as possible. Only generations who consume after the
shocks occur can possibly share in the risk: generations who are deceased
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have any risk-bearing capacity any more. Future generations who have not
yet started consuming, in contrast, can share in current risks. Optimal risk
sharing implies that a current shock affects consumption during the rest of
the life of all living and future generations by that percentage. The shock is
thus smoothed out as widely as possible across both individuals and periods
so that each separate individual in each period is affected as little as possi-
ble. Collective pension schemes can thus be interpreted as the pension scheme
having invested on behalf of all its current contributors before these contrib-
utors actually started to work and pay a pension premium.
In our partial equilibrium setting, the beneﬁt of additional risk sharing is
not to reduce risk but rather to increase the expected payoff from risky invest-
ments by generations who have not entered the labor market yet.28 In a gen-
eral equilibrium context in which the supply of risk-bearing assets is less than
inﬁnitely elastic, the additional risk-bearing capacity of younger generations
reduces the price of risk. This, in turn, reduces the risk born by the current
generations.
With intergenerational risk sharing across non-overlapping generations, the
expectation of the buffer that is transferred to future workers is positive but
can be negative for some bad draws. This risk sharing thus works only if
future generations are forced to pay back their unsecured loans in these cases.
Mandatory participation in sectoral pension schemes helps to enforce this. In
this way, the government allows pension schemes to lay a claim on the collat-
eral of workers: their human capital.
Just as in the case of relieving the borrowing constraints of young work-
ers, mandatory participation is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for
making risk sharing among non-overlapping generations feasible by secur-
ing the collateral of future workers. In particular, employers in a sector face
competition from other sectors on the labor market. With mobile labor across
sectors, these employers may have to pay compensating wage differentials
to attract workers to their sector if these workers are forced to pay back
implicit debt extended by the sectoral pension scheme. In that case, work-
ers can in fact evade the compulsory participation and shift the implicit bur-
den on employment in the sector by seeking employment in other sectors.
As a direct consequence of the mobility of young workers, the buffers are in
fact beneﬁting the shareholders of the ﬁrms in the sector (in case of tradable
goods), the consumers of the commodities produced by the sector (in case of
non-tradable goods such as health care), or the current retirees in the pension
scheme (in case of mobile workers, capital and consumers). Indeed, depending
28 Gollier (2006) stresses this result and formulates a simple model of risk sharing between
two agents facing independent risks. In an intergenerational context, the young can share in
the risks of the old. The old, however, do not share in the risks of the young. The possibilities
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on the various elasticities, competition limits the possibilities for risk sharing
among non-overlapping generations, especially if behavior is sensitive to costs
(as indicated, for example, by the elasticity of sectoral labor supply).
If young workers face substantial negative buffers on entry into a pension
scheme, they may vote with not only their feet (by seeking employment else-
where or reducing labor supply) but also their voice. In particular, they may
encourage the pension scheme to default on the pension obligations to older
workers and retirees, for example by no longer indexing their pensions to
inﬂation. In addition to the economic considerations of competition on labor,
capital and commodity markets, political economy considerations thus make
current participants vulnerable to large negative buffers. This is why regula-
tors adopt the so-called discontinuity principle: a pension fund should be able
to comply to its obligations also if, starting today, no new generations would
be willing to enter the scheme. Recognizing that pension schemes cannot eas-
ily secure the human capital of future generations, this discontinuity principle
limits the scope for risk sharing among non-overlapping generations.29
Risk sharing among non-overlapping generations can probably best be
implemented by the largest pool we have to enforce this risk sharing: the
national state. In particular, in combination with public debt, the govern-
ment can employ its tax power to commit future generations to share risks
with current generations. To illustrate, by issuing indexed bonds and longev-
ity bonds, the government protects current generations against inﬂation and
longevity risks and shifts these risks in part to future generations of tax pay-
ers. Even the national state, however, is restricted by international mobility
and other behavioral responses to taxes (e.g. the wage elasticity of labor sup-
ply). Moreover, in a democracy, the state can commit only imperfectly. Young
generations can always exert political pressure to change laws that force them
to pick up the tab of risks that the older generations have shifted unto them.
Similarly, current generations, who control the votes, can always consume
the buffers that were initially assigned to the future generations. This illus-
trates how difﬁcult it is to actually implement and enforce credible contracts
between non-overlapping generations.
Table 2 illustrates the potential welfare gains of intergenerational risk shar-
ing as well as the distribution of the buffer that new generations face upon
entry to the labor market. The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the welfare gain
(in terms of certainty equivalent consumption) when a cohort starts to opti-
mally participate in equity-market risk B years before entering the labor mar-
29 Also positive buffers may in fact beneﬁt current rather than future generations because of
political or economic reasons. In particular, if buffers are large, current generations (and espe-
cially the older generations) may put pressure on the fund to use these buffers to improve their
pensions. Moreover, young workers are willing to work for the sector at low wages, thereby
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TABLE 2 – WELFARE GAINS OF INTERGENERATIONAL RISK SHARING WITH











1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
5 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.0
10 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.6 1.9
15 6.2 5.3 4.6 3.6 2.6
20 8.3 6.9 5.9 4.5 3.3
ket compared to the ﬁrst-best contract explored in section 3 (in which case
B is in fact 0 because agents do not participate in risks before they enter
the labor market). These calculations assume that the optimal exposure is
acquired immediately at that time and that the pension scheme can costlessly
force a generation to pay back possibly negative buffers (i.e. pension debt)
when entering the labor force. The welfare gain from optimally participating
in stock-market risk B years before entering the work force can be approxi-






The intuition behind this expression is that the duration of the risky invest-
ments is B and that the welfare gain for a year of optimal participation in the
stock market is given by half of the potential reward for risk31 1




The welfare loss thus rises with the reward to risk taking (i.e. the Sharpe ratio
λ) and declines with the willingness to do so (i.e. relative risk aversion θ).
Table 2 shows that participation before entry to the labor market can raise
welfare substantially. To illustrate, participation 15years before entry to the
labor market increases welfare by 6.2%. As discussed before, the main draw-
back of intergenerational risk sharing is discontinuity risk: new generations
facing substantial deficits when they start working may decide not to partic-
ipate in the contract. The probability that the individual will start adult life
with a loss is 35%, the probability that the loss exceeds two working years is
28%.
The credibility of intergenerational risk sharing can be improved if the dis-
continuity risk is reduced through dynamic investment strategies that reduce
30 This equation is closely related to Equation (7). Note that the average length of the invest-
ment period is different.
31 Only half of the reward to risk is actually a welfare gain because the individual also bears
additional risk, which harms welfare.384 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
TABLE 3 – PROBABILITY THAT THE MAXIMUM LOSS OF DYNAMIC STRATEGY TO







1 3 25 43
51 5 2 9 5 7
10 17 49 68
15 14 42 58
20 11 29 45
the probability of substantial funding deficits when young cohorts start their
career on the labor market. We model these investment strategies as buy and
hold investments in equity as well as put options that limit the maximum loss
to either 24, 12 or 6 months of salary. The fraction of annual income that is
borrowed B years before entering the labor market is optimized. Tables 2 and
3 report the welfare gains of such strategies compared to the ﬁrst-best case of
section 3, as well as the probability that the maximum loss is incurred.
Table 2 also shows that in case of participation 15years before entry to
the labor market a welfare gain of 2.6% is left if new generations are only
willing to participate in the contract if their initial funding deficit is limited
to six months income. Table 3 shows that the probability that this maximum
loss will materialize is 58%. If new participants set two years of salary at risk,
the welfare gain amounts to 4.6%, while the probability that as much as two
years of salary will be lost is 14%. The investment strategy associated with
these guarantees closely corresponds to solvency rules imposed on collective
pension schemes by supervisors in order to ensure that the discontinuity risk
does not become large.
Also Gollier (2006) has considered the beneﬁts of intergenerational risk
sharing. He puts a constraint on how large the negative buffer can become
by requiring that at any point in time, the fund must be large enough to
repay the contributions made in the past. This in fact puts a constraint on
how large the negative buffer can become in absolute value. The solvency
constraint thus reduces the ability of the fund to time diversify the portfo-
lio risk. This has consequences for optimal saving and investment. As regards
saving, the solvency constraint strengthens precautionary saving, especially if
the fund is close to the solvency constraint. Indeed, the fund then puts aside
additional funds to escape the limit on intergenerational risk sharing; the
ﬁnancial reserves of the fund in fact act like a buffer stock. As regards invest-
ment, the fund invests mainly in bonds if it has a small amount of assets
and is thus close to the solvency constraint. Intuitively, the pension fund con-
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bonds if equity declines in value in line with a dynamic strategy that replicates
the put option. The fund thus behaves as if it exhibits decreasing absolute risk
aversion. This behavior of selling equity when the stock market goes down
contrasts with an individual who invests optimally in the absence of liquid-
ity constraints. Such an investor buys additional equity to keep constant the
share of equity in overall wealth.32 Gollier (2006) shows that the welfare gains
from intergenerational risk sharing are substantially reduced when solvency
constraints are imposed.
5.4 Welfare Losses Due to Uniform Premium Rates and Asset Allocations
So far we have assumed that the collective pension scheme offers every partic-
ipant the pension contract that ﬁts personal references and circumstances. In
reality, pension schemes usually impose identical contributions rates and asset
allocations for all participants even though agents typically differ substan-
tially in their rate of time preference ρi and risk aversion θi (see e.g. Cocco
et al. (2005)). Uniform and age independent contribution rates and asset allo-
cations are optimal only under very stringent assumptions. To illustrate, in
the simple model without risk discussed in section 3.2, the optimal contribu-
tion rate is constant if the real interest rate and the rate of time preference
coincide. Equation (1) shows that consumption is constant over time in that
case so that, with constant labor income, the optimal saving rate and thus
the optimal pension premium is also constant.33 The optimal share of ﬁnan-
cial wealth invested in equity is age-independent only if human wealth has the
optimal exposure to the risk factor given by (4). This is not the case in our
benchmark model with riskless human capital. Uniformity of the asset alloca-
tion over agents with different preferences requires even stronger restrictions
on the parameters.
With a stationary population, one can aggregate over the various age
cohorts to arrive at a ﬁrst-order approximation for the ratio between aggre-
gated wealth of all participants in the pension scheme to aggregate saving (see







32 Also this investor decreases the absolute size of its equity holdings as overall wealth
declines.
33 In models that include wage growth, the optimal saving rate out of labor income (i.e. the
optimal premium rate) remains constant over the life cycle and thus does not depend on age if
the optimal growth rate of consumption equals the growth rate of labor income. This implies
a particular relationship between the growth rate of wage income, the interest rate and prefer-
ence parameters (in particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the rate of time
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TABLE 4 – WELFARE LOSSES WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST-BEST SOLUTION IN
THE CASE IN WHICH CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS ARE BASED
UPON THE WRONG RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE ρ OR THE WRONG PARAMETER
OF RISK AVERSION θ. THE ACTUAL PREFERENCE PARAMETERS ARE GIVEN BY
P =0.02 AND θ =5
Rate of time preference ρ
1% 2% 3% 5%
Risk aversion θ
2 −26.7% −31.2% −40.3% −74.8%
3 −4.6% −4.9% −6.8% −16.3%
5 −0.3% 0% −0.2% −2.5%
10 −2.5% −2.3% −2.3% −2.7%
The actual preference parameters are given by ρ=0.02 and θ =5
where a bar represents the value for a variable aggregated over all participants
of a pension scheme. The ratio of aggregate overall wealth to aggregate ﬁnan-
cial wealth thus approximately corresponds to total life time divided by the
length of the retirement period. Using (9) and (4) in (5), one can approxi-
mate the investment share in equity for a pension scheme of participants with
homogeneous preferences. On the basis of our benchmark values, we ﬁnd that
a pension scheme should invest 80% of its ﬁnancial assets in equity.
We do not address the optimal asset allocation of a collective pension
scheme with heterogeneous agents, which in addition to the age composi-
tion of the scheme depends on the distribution of preference parameters as
well as relative weights in the collective welfare function. Rather, in line with
the analysis in Subsection 4.5, we compute the welfare losses if consumption
smoothing and risk exposures are based on the wrong preference parameters.
Subsection 4.5 reported results for borrowing constrained investors. We inter-
preted these results as misspeciﬁed individual contracts because of misper-
ceived preferences and poor investment advice.
Table 4 presents similar results for the case in which collective pension
schemes succeed in alleviating borrowing constraints for young, working gen-
erations (but do not allow future generations to participate in equity-market
risk). The table shows the impact of using the wrong risk aversion parame-
ter or rate of time preference if constraints (including borrowing constraints)
are absent so that premium and portfolio shares can adjust ﬂexibly to shocks.
These simulations indicate what happens if a collective scheme cannot tailor
its behavior to the actual preferences of each individual participant, for exam-
ple because it does not have access to information about the preferences of
the individual (since the individual does not implements its own decisions butSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 387
has delegated these to the pension scheme). These losses assume that individ-
uals do not have any access to capital markets outside the pension scheme.34
Furthermore, the assumed CRRA utility functions imply that the coefﬁcient
of risk aversion is equal to the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution. The wrong coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion thus distorts not only
optimal investment behavior (or risk sharing) but also optimal saving behav-
ior (or intertemporal consumption smoothing).
5.5 Risk Exposure and Welfare Effects in Some Stylized Collective Models
Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 considered the idealized collective model that removes
the borrowing constraints early in the life cycle and allows intergenerational
risk sharing while implementing the individually optimal contract. In prac-
tice, collective pension schemes engage in risk sharing among non-overlapping
generations by levying equal contributions on all active generations at a par-
ticular point in time. Furthermore, the recovery premia and indexation cuts
imposed in case of funding deficits typically decline over time as the funding
deficits are gradually closed. Rather than behaving as a random walk as in
the optimal contract, consumption thus features mean reversion. Hence, risks
are not optimally smoothed over the life cycle. Moreover, from the point of
view of overall remaining wealth, the generations alive at the time the shock
hits bear a larger part of the overall burden than the generations who are not
yet participating in the labor force even though all cohorts face the same con-
sumption level at each point in time. The uniform, age-independent premia
and beneﬁts, which depend only on the aggregate funding status of the fund,
thus imply imperfect consumption smoothing and imperfect risk sharing. This
subsection considers implications of actual pension contracts for risk expo-
sures and welfare.
Boender et al. (2006) compares the performance of a number of differ-
ent pension schemes using a semi-variance criterion to evaluate consumption
during retirement.35 The study implicitly assumes that agents are risk neu-
tral with respect to consumption during the working life because only the
expected premium level is taken into account when evaluating policies.36
Working agents are therefore willing to bear the risk of ﬂuctuating premia
with small rewards in the form of risk premia. The retired generations can
thus take advantage of the equity premium even though they do not bear
much risk. One of the schemes that is considered is an individual scheme
34 In practice, it is easier for an individual to correct undersaving of the pension fund by
saving more than to correct oversaving of the fund by borrowing against the pension wealth.
35 This criterion is closely associated with preferences that are associated with loss aversion
(see Subsection 6.3.4).
36 The paper assumes mean reversion in stock prices (see section 6.2.5).388 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
with an age dependent asset mix.37 The paper explores also a hybrid collec-
tive scheme where both the contribution rate and the (real) beneﬁt level of all
participants adjust in identical ways to ﬂuctuations in the collective funding
ratio. The paper argues that the hybrid collective scheme is welfare improving
compared to the individual scheme due to the value of the buffers in intergen-
erational risk sharing. The study abstracts from heterogeneity between agents.
For an extensive evaluation of this study, see Boender et al. (2006).
Cui et al. (2006) consider the welfare gains due to intergenerational risk
sharing in four pension deals. These deals are approximately fair in value
terms and assume time-invariant asset allocations for the collective contracts.
Their main ﬁnding is that these collective schemes can add value from the
perspective of new entrants even relative to the optimal unrestricted individ-
ual scheme without intergenerational risk sharing and even if the scheme is
initially underfunded. The welfare gain is estimated to be 1–4% in terms of
certainty equivalent consumption. The paper also analyzes the impact of sol-
vency constraints, which ensure that the probability of underfunding should
remain small. The paper shows that the reduction in risk taking implied by
this constraint does not substantially reduce the welfare gains of the collective
scheme. The results of Cui et al. (2006) are based on homogeneous popula-
tions and imply significant risk taking by the fund (up to 100% in equity) in
the unconstrained case. The paper does not report how long it takes before
situations of underfunding are recovered and how deep underfunding can be.
This makes it difﬁcult to assess how serious the discontinuity risk actually is.
Koijen et al. (2007) consider stylized collective pension schemes using asset
allocation rules that vary with the funding ratio of the scheme. The funding
ratio, ft is deﬁned as the ratio of the market value of the assets over the mar-
ket value of time invariant basis beneﬁts bb. Beneﬁt improvements or reduc-
tions ba
t occur during the entire retirement period whenever the funding ratio
is more or less than one at the time of retirement.38 The basis premium πb
is actuarially fair for the basis beneﬁts.39 If the funding ratio is below one,
additional pension contributions πa
t will be imposed, and likewise reductions
are given if the funding ratio is high. The total pension contribution and the
37 In contrast to the model in section 2, the asset mix does not depend on past shocks in
the ﬁnancial markets. Hence, individuals can not construct options by dynamically trading in
bonds and stocks. Since options are not available in the model, ﬁnancial markets are in effect
dynamically incomplete. In these circumstances, collective pension funds can help to complete
markets by in effect creating new assets through pension contracts.
38 Agents thus obtain ﬁxed annuities at the time of retirement. After they have obtained
these annuities, they are no longer exposed to risk. Agents are therefore exposed to the risk
of underfunding at the time of retirement. In fact, if the pension fund is underfunded at the
time they retire, the value of their annuity is reduced so that the consumption level is scaled
down during the rest of their life.
39 Since both the basis premium and the basis beneﬁts are risk free, the risk-free interest
rate is used to compute the cost price of the basis beneﬁts.SAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 389





The asset mix xt as well as the beneﬁts and contributions adjustments depend
linearly on the funding ratio:
xt =α0+α1(1− ft) (13)
πa
t =β1(1− ft) (14)
ba
t =ς1(1− ft) (15)
The paper considers three stylized schemes: a collective deﬁned contribution
scheme with a ﬁxed contribution rate (β1 = 0), a collective deﬁned beneﬁt
scheme with a ﬁxed beneﬁt level (ς1 =0) and a hybrid collective scheme in
which both the contribution and beneﬁt levels can ﬂuctuate with the funding
rate. The parameters in (13)–(15) are optimized conditional on a condition on
the half-time of any deficits in the fund.
Table 5 summarizes the main results. The DC schemes perform worse than
DB schemes. The intuition is that consumption during the working life con-
tributes more to the risk-sharing capacity of an individual than consumption
during retirement because the working life lasts longer than the retirement
period does and is also discounted less heavily.40 The hybrid systems perform
best because these schemes utilize the risk-bearing capacities of individuals
during both their working and retirement periods.
The results in Table 5 illustrate the importance of the recovery period.
With a relatively short half-life of three years (i.e. the period during which
half of the funding imbalance is made up), collective schemes do worse in
terms of ex-ante welfare than the optimal individual scheme from Subsec-
tion 4.3 (i.e. including borrowing constraints, annuities and discrete trad-
ing but with fully ﬂexible premia, annuity levels, and portfolio choices). For
longer recovery periods (a half-life of 10 years), in contrast, the collective
hybrid scheme can realize a certainty equivalent consumption level that is
4.7% above that for the optimal individual scheme.
40 An argument that goes the other way is that consumption when young cannot respond
to shocks that occur after consumption has taken place. Hence, retirement consumption can
respond to more shocks. Flexibility in retirement consumption is thus more valuable than ﬂex-
ibility in working-life consumption. If the length of the working period becomes smaller com-
pared to the expected retired period, the DC scheme becomes more efﬁcient compared ta a
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TABLE 5 – CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTIVE SCHEMES AND WELFARE GAINS
RELATIVE TO OPTIMAL INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT DISCUSSED IN SUBSECTION 4.3
(I.E. INCLUDING BORROWING CONSTRAINTS, ANNUITIES AND DISCRETE TRAD-
ING BUT WITH FULLY FLEXIBLE PREMIA, ANNUITY LEVELS, AND PORTFOLIO
CHOICES)
Half-life 3 years Half life 61
2 years Half-life 10 years
CDC CDB CH CDC CDB CH CDC CDB CH
α0 9.2% 28.8% 39.1% 17.9% 54% 76.6% 25.4% 73.5% 94.9%
α1 −0.35 −0.08 −0.01 −0.23 0.14 0.24 −0.08 0.26 0.24
πb 14.6% 15.5% 15.0% 14.1% 15.9% 14.9% 13.6% 16.2% 15.0%
bb 82.1% 87.3% 84.7% 79.3% 89.4% 84.0% 76.8% 91.3% 84.4%
β1 0 0.99 0.73 0 0.53 0.38 0 0.38 0.27
ς1 −3.25 0 −0.79 −1.65 0 −0.42 −1.12 0 −0.29
Welfare gain −4.7% −2.4% −1.8% −4.1% 0.4% 1.8% −3.4% 2.9% 4.7%
Table 5 contains also relevant information on the risk-sharing properties
of the collective schemes. In the optimized hybrid scheme with a half-life of
three years a 10% funding deficit implies a reduction in beneﬁt level of 7.9
percentage points to 76.8%. Likewise the contribution rate would be 7.3 per-
centage points above the base level of 15.0%. In this particular case, the asset
mix would be almost ﬁxed at an equity share of 39%. In case of longer recov-
ery periods, more investment risk is taken and the contribution and beneﬁt
levels will be substantially more stable.
6 EXTENSIONS
6.1 Human Capital
Sections 3, 4 and 5 restricted the analysis to two ﬁnancial assets, namely
stocks and risk-free bonds. We assumed a constant and riskless wage so
that in the unconstrained case human capital was in fact equivalent to a
risk-free bond. Sections 4 and 5 allowed for the non-tradability of human
capital: moral hazard and adverse selection prevent individuals from trading
claims against their future labor income. The non-tradability of human capi-
tal affects both intertemporal consumption smoothing and risk sharing.
This section considers human capital more closely. Rather than assuming
a constant and riskless wage over the life cycle (until retirement), we intro-
duce realistic career patterns (i.e. wage income depends on age) and allow
wage income to be stochastic. Human capital risk can be decomposed into
two components: an individual (idiosyncratic) component that is speciﬁc toSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 391
the individual and an aggregate component that applies to all individuals
alike. Aggregate risk may be more important for some individuals than oth-
ers. Entrepreneurs, for example, tend to bear more aggregate risk than civil
servants.
Subsection 6.1.1 ﬁrst discusses more realistic career patterns and the
constraints on intertemporal consumption smoothing that result in the pres-
ence of borrowing constraints, then Subsection 6.1.2 introduces non-insur-
able idiosyncratic human capital risk, and Subsection 6.1.3 combines this risk
with borrowing constraints. The implications of aggregate human capital are
explored in Subsection 6.1.4, while Subsection 6.1.5 analyzes what happens if
labor supply becomes endogenous.
6.1.1 Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing and Borrowing Constraints
Until now, we have stressed the consequences of borrowing constraints for
risk taking. Especially young agents often cannot borrow against the collat-
eral of their human capital to invest in equity. As a result of these short-sale
constraints, the shadow value of equity for young agents exceeds the market
value. Borrowing constraints, however, constrain not only risk taking but also
intertemporal consumption smoothing for young agents. This is especially rel-
evant for young high-skilled agents facing a steep career pattern: the youngest
years feature low earnings but rapid growth of these earnings. Hence, these
agents would like to borrow against the future value of their human capital
for the purpose of consumption smoothing. The desire to borrow is particu-
larly large if precautionary saving motives are weak on account of a low level
of risk. In the presence of borrowing constraints, young agents can not cap-
italize the value of their human capital to raise their consumption in youth.
They in effect feature shadow interest rates ri that exceed the market rate.41
6.1.2 Idiosyncratic Risks
The idiosyncratic component of human capital risk is uncorrelated to any
other risk in the economy. This component can thus in principle be diver-
siﬁed in ﬁnancial markets. However, this would give rise to serious moral
hazard problems; individuals would reduce their effort and claim that the
resulting low wage income has been due to misfortune instead of shirking.
Indeed, human capital is special in that it is not really tradable in ﬁnancial
markets and introduces market incompleteness. Nevertheless, social insuranc-
es (such as disability and unemployment insurances) do provide partial insur-
ance against idiosyncratic human capital risk but moral hazard reduces the
41 This shadow interest rate is determined such that (2) is met with the constrained con-
sumption growth rate. Hence, rather than that (2) determines the growth rate of consumption
at a ﬁxed interest rate, the expression determines the implicit individual-speciﬁc interest rate ri
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optimal coverage, thereby leaving a substantial amount of risk with the indi-
vidual.
An important topic for future research is to estimate idiosyncratic human
capital risk in the Netherlands and how it has developed over time. On
the one hand, reduced coverage of social insurance and more competition
and the associated creative destruction may have increased this risk. On the
other hand, a more ﬂexible labor market may reduce the length of unemploy-
ment spells and increase the opportunities for outsiders to ﬁnd work, thereby
reducing persistent labor-market risks. Within idiosyncratic risks, one can dis-
tinguish between temporary and permanent wage shocks. Abowd and Card
(1989) and Topel and Ward (1992) have shown that log wages in the United
States are close to a random walk, where the standard deviation of innova-
tions is large, namely about 10% per year.
The uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty about human capital affects both
optimal saving (i.e. intertemporal risk sharing over time) and optimal invest-
ment (i.e. risk sharing). Persistent shocks that substantially affect the value of
human capital can have substantial effects, especially on precautionary savings
(see Koo (1995) and Viceira (2001)).42 If we extend the basic model model
laid out in section 2 with uninsurable uncertainty about human capital, pru-
dent investors increase precautionary saving.
As regards investment, the introduction of idiosyncratic risk reduces the
value of human capital.43 In the beginning of the working career, over-
all wealth consists mainly of human capital. With ﬁxed relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) and thus a ﬁxed optimal share of overall wealth invested in
risk-bearing assets (see (4)),44 a reduction in human wealth as a result of idio-
syncratic risk decreases the initial absolute holdings of equity. Later on during
the life cycle, the stock of ﬁnancial wealth increases as a result of larger pre-
cautionary savings. This tends to raise the absolute size of stock holdings. As
agents age, human capital becomes less important compared to ﬁnancial cap-
ital and eventually the effect on absolute equity holdings of larger ﬁnancial
wealth dominates the effect of smaller human capital. The young holding less
equity and the old holding more equity implies that the age pattern of equity
holdings becomes less skewed towards the young as a result of uninsurable
42 Hence, more ideosyncratic risk as a result of increased labor-market ﬂexibility boosts life-
course saving for precautionary motives.
43 In the presence of undiversiﬁable wage risk, we can no longer rely on market prices to
measure human capital but must employ individual-speciﬁc risk premia (or pricing kernels) to
discount future wage income. If wages behave like a random walk, the reduction in human
wealth is particularly large at the beginning of the career when households face uncertainty
that accumulates over a long horizon.
44 Gollier and Prat (1996) derive the conditions on more general utility functions for equity
holdings to decline if investors bear another independent background risk. In particular, inves-
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human-capital risk: whereas human capital increases the demand for equity,
human-capital risk reduces it. As a fraction of ﬁnancial assets, stock hold-
ings unambiguously decline during the entire working life as a result of undi-
versiﬁable background risk in human capital. The reason is that human cap-
ital becomes less important compared to ﬁnancial capital. Hence, a smaller
share of ﬁnancial wealth needs to be exposed to equity risk to obtain the cor-
rect exposure of overall wealth to that risk (see the impact of a smaller ratio
Ht/Ft on f ∗
t in (5)).
6.1.3 Idiosyncratic Risks and Limited Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing
Combined with borrowing constraints (and steep career patterns) limiting
intertemporal consumption smoothing, idiosyncratic human-capital risk intro-
duces other complications. With borrowing constraints, the individual is not
able to optimally diversify labor income risks over time. As a direct conse-
quence of the reduced ability to smooth risks intertemporally, the individual
will take less risk on its investment portfolio if the household owns positive
ﬁnancial wealth.45 The effects of background labor-income risks on invest-
ment behavior seems relatively minor but become more important if borrow-
ing constraints limit intertemporal consumption smoothing of large transitory
shocks. Indeed, the ﬂexibility of intertemporal consumption smoothing is a
key determinant of the risk that agents can afford to take on.
On the basis of numerical simulations, Gollier (2005) shows that this may
cause young households with small ﬁnancial reserves to invest less in equity
than older households who are less constrained by borrowing constraints
in diversifying risks over a longer period. In a similar vein, Cohen and
Einav (2005) ﬁnd that young investors choose portfolios that are less tilted
towards equity than the portfolios of middle-aged investors. Thus, the com-
bination of labor-market risks and a steep career pattern preventing optimal
intertemporal consumption smoothing (or the potential of large drops in
labor income) thus turn around the result from unconstrained models that
young households should hold substantial amounts of equity that exceed the
amounts (both in absolute values and as a share of ﬁnancial wealth) of older
households. Indeed, the desire to hold a safe, liquid stock of precautionary
savings has become one of the explanations for the equity premium puzzle
and for why young households do not participate much in the stock market
(see Constantinides and Dufﬁe (1996) and Brav et al. (2002)). Social insurance
that provide insurance of human capital risk can thus boost equity invest-
ments and thus increase the risk-bearing capacity of the economy. Hence,
pension schemes can raise the demand for equity not only by relieving short-
sale constraints but also by providing insurance against human-capital risks.
45 This is similar to the impact of a deﬁned-contribution pension system that forces individ-
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Liquidity constraints not only make investment behavior more conservative
but also strengthen precautionary saving motives – even if ﬁnancial wealth
is positive. Indeed, by investing conservatively and setting aside resources
through saving, individuals ensure the presence of a ﬁnancial buffer that helps
them to optimally time diversify temporary risks.46 Precautionary motives
rather than saving for retirement tend to be the main reason why young
households save (see Cocco et al. (2005)). As a direct consequence of the
additional saving, ﬁnancial wealth will be higher later on in life, which will
tend to increase equity exposure when old. Hence, precautionary saving fur-
ther weakens the result that the young should have much more equity expo-
sure than the old if idiosyncratic risk is combined with borrowing constraints
and a steep career pattern preventing intertemporal consumption smoothing
at young ages.
Davis et al. (2005) formulate a model in which individuals can borrow but
at a cost that exceeds the risk-free rate of return. As far as investment behav-
ior is concerned, high borrowing rates discourage young households from
acquiring a large equity exposure by leveraging their portfolio. As regards
consumption smoothing, high borrowing rates discourage dissaving early in
life so that agents can build up a stock of ﬁnancial wealth earlier, which helps
to boost equity exposure later on in life. Their model is better able to ﬁt
the empirical evidence on borrowing and individual equity holdings over the
life cycle. They show that a borrowing rate equal to the expected return on
equity minimizes the overall demand for equity over the life cycle. The rea-
son is that this crowds out all borrowing aimed at buying equity but does
not unnecessarily discourage borrowing for consumption-smoothing purposes,
which boosts wealth and equity exposure later in life. High borrowing rates
do explain why the equity exposure of older workers is larger than that of
younger workers.
The behavior of individuals facing borrowing constraints resembles that of
a pension fund facing solvency constraints. Both borrowing constraints and
solvency constraints harm the ability to time diversify risk. They thus reduce
risk-bearing capacities and encourage precautionary saving to escape these
constraints. Saving occurs not only to smooth consumption in the face of the
depreciation of human capital during retirement but also to help smooth con-
sumption in the face of labor-income shocks during the active life. Especially
at low levels of ﬁnancial wealth, the latter precautionary motive may domi-
nate the retirement motive.
Non-insured medical expenses can be an important source of idiosyncratic
background risk for older households. Hence, also older households may face
46 In the case of permanent shocks, optimal consumption smoothing dictates that consump-
tion is reduced in line with income. Habit formation, however, can then still give rise to a
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idiosyncratic risk with implications for saving behavior (i.e. precautionary sav-
ing) and investment behavior (and also the willingness to take out annuities).
In particular, these households then also save for precautionary reasons and
when they start to be subject to these risks invest more conservatively and
are discouraged from taking out illiquid annuities. An important topic for
future research is to distinguish between liquid precautionary saving and illiq-
uid retirement saving. The papers discussed do not distinguish between these
two categories and assume that all saving is liquid.
6.1.4 Aggregate Risks
An aggregate component to wage risk introduces other issues. First of all,
to the extent that aggregate human-capital risk is correlated with equity
risk, human capital becomes more like equity. Equity and human capital are
thus substitutes. As a direct consequence, the wealth share invested in equity
declines compared the case in which human capital does not carry any macro-
economic risk. This is especially so at the beginning of the working life when
human capital constitutes the bulk of overall wealth. The share of ﬁnancial
wealth invested in equity thus declines less sharply over the life cycle. As
noted above, if human wealth has the optimal exposure to equity risk given
by the optimal exposure (4), the part of ﬁnancial wealth invested in equity
is constant during the life cycle. This may be relevant for entrepreneurs who
face substantial aggregate risk.
Another issue arises if wage risk is not perfectly correlated with equity risk.
In that case, a second macro-economic risk factor emerges. This risk factor
can in principle be traded through wage-indexed bonds. In particular, young
agents who are long on this risk factor can trade this risk with older agents
who do not bear (much of) this risk. In practice, however, we do not observe
wage-indexed bonds. A wage-indexed deﬁned-beneﬁt pension may, however,
act as a substitute for tradable wage-indexed bonds. Through such a pen-
sion system, the younger generations share wage risk with the retired agents
(see Beetsma and Bovenberg (2007)). Hence, pension schemes allow not only
young workers with ample human capital to capture the equity risk premium
but also older agents to capture part of the human capital risk premium.
Compulsory pension schemes may allow human capital to become in fact
tradable.
Older agents are willing to absorb wage risk even without compensation if
retirees care about the value of their pension relative to the average standard
of living in the economy (see also Subsection 6.3.2). Moreover, with these
so-called standard-of-living preferences, positive correlation between equity
and wage risk makes equity a more attractive investment for old-age pen-
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than human capital to ﬁnance their consumption.47 Intuitively, stocks match
to some extent the liability risks that are associated with changes in desired
consumption based on the aggregate standard of living. Hence, whereas pos-
itive correlation between equity and wages reduces the equity holdings of
young agents with ample human capital, this correlation may actually raise
the equity holdings of older agents with standard-of-living utility. The conclu-
sion is again that the age proﬁle of equity holding is thus less steeply declin-
ing than in the benchmark model.
This conclusion is strengthened in a recent paper by Benzoni et al. (2007).
This study indicates that labor income is cointegrated with equity prices. This
makes human capital a closer equity substitute for younger workers with a
longer investment horizon than for older workers and retirees with a shorter
investment horizon. Consequently, young workers invest less in stocks than
older agents do. Benzoni et al. (2007) ﬁnds that the cointegration between
wages and stocks can explain why young workers do not hold positive equity.
In fact, they ﬁnd that young investors should want to short stocks because
their human capital is effectively a leveraged security with large exposure to
stock markets.
6.1.5 Endogenous Labor Supply
Sections 4 and 5 showed that more ﬂexibility to adjust premia and retire-
ment beneﬁts can substantially enhance the capacity to bear risks. Bodie et
al. (1992) show that the same holds for the ﬂexibility to adjust labor supply
and the consumption of leisure. With endogenous labor supply, human capital
amounts to the discounted value of potential wage income (i.e. wage income if
no leisure would be consumed) and is thus larger than the discounted value
of actual wage income. Indeed, the stock of wealth is larger now because it
ﬁnances consumption of not only produced goods but also leisure. As the
share f in (4) applies now to a larger stock of wealth, the overall demand
for risk-bearing capital rises. Indeed, shocks can be absorbed by adjusting
consumption of both produced commodities and leisure. This enhances the
capacity of the economy to absorb risks and thus increases the aggregate
demand for risk taking.
If labor supply becomes more ﬂexible over the entire life cycle, the share
of ﬁnancial wealth invested in risk-bearing assets, f ∗, now varies even more
with age. This changes if labor supply is especially ﬂexible around retirement
because agents can adjust the time and speed with which they retire. In that
47 A similar argument applies to pension funds providing wage-indexed pension beneﬁts. See
de Jong (2005) for the market valuation of wage-indexed liabilities, taking into account the
potential correlation between equity and wages. In particular, this correlation ceteris paribus
reduces the market value of wage-indexed liabilities by raising the implicit risk premium when
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case, also older workers can afford to invest in risk-bearing assets. This points
to the importance of a ﬂexible labor market for older workers to sustain the
supply of risk-bearing capital in an aging economy. A formal analysis of the
impact of ﬂexibility of the retirement date on the optimal risk taking is pro-
vided by Farhi and Panageas (2007).
6.2 Financial Risk Factors and Longevity Risk
6.2.1 Introduction
Apart from human capital risk, the main risk factors that individuals face
are interest rate risk, inﬂation risk, equity risk and longevity risk. Until now,
we have explored only equity risk and imposed that stock returns were not
predictable. Subsections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 introduce interest-rate risk as well as
inﬂation risk. Subsection 6.2.3 brieﬂy discusses the evidence on stock return
predictability and its implications for optimal consumption smoothing and
risk sharing over the life cycle. Subsection 6.2.4 considers micro as well as
macro longevity risk and the value of annuity markets and longevity bonds.
6.2.2 Interest Rate Risk
So far we ignored inﬂation risk and assumed a constant interest rate. If (real)
interest rates ﬂuctuate over time, the investor is faced with an additional risk
factor. Fluctuations in interest rates affect the value of the human capital as
well as the value of the bond portfolio. Early in the life cycle, portfolios are
to be held with long durations to hedge against the required consumption
during retirement. The duration of human capital is typically shorter than
required. If bonds or interest rate derivatives would be available with very
long maturities, the part of ﬁnancial wealth that is invested in ﬁxed income
can be invested in these assets to obtain the optimal duration for total wealth.
In the more realistic case in which the maximum maturity of traded bonds
and derivatives is limited, the fraction of ﬁnancial wealth invested in bonds
is increased at the expense of equity. In this way, the duration of the assets is
more closely aligned with the duration of the consumption pattern while the
remaining interest rate risk is balanced with equity risk. Campbell and Viceira
(2001), Brennan and Xia (2000), Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005) and Munk
and Sorensen (2005) have considered the implications of time varying inter-
est rates on the optimal demand for long-term bonds and analyze the welfare
gains of hedging variations in real rates.
A number of recent studies report that the expected bond returns are
clearly time-varying, i.e. bonds are more attractive in some periods than in
others, see e.g. Cochrane and Piazessi (2005). In particular, the real (as well
as the nominal) bond risk premium is increasing in the real rate. Sangvinat-
sos and Wachter (2005) show that unconstrained long-term investors (as con-
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tion s in bond premia. Koijen et al. (2006b) consider the case of borrowing
constrained life-cycle investors explored in section 4. They ﬁnd that short-sell
constraints reduce the potential gains associated with bond timing strategies
because these gains can be obtained only at the expense of reduced equity
exposure unless very long maturity bonds would be traded. The economic
gains realized by bond timing strategies peak around the age of 50 (when
agents have build up substantial ﬁnancial wealth and are less constrained
by borrowing constraints) and are hump-shaped over the life-cycle. If inves-
tors can avoid borrowing constraints through participation in collective pen-
sion schemes (see section 5), they may be able to realize the larger beneﬁts
reported in Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005).
6.2.3 Inﬂation Risk
We have assumed so far that inﬂation risk is negligible or, equivalently, that
all assets that have been considered are inﬂation indexed. In reality, inﬂa-
tion linked assets are rarely traded and inﬂation is an important risk factor
for long term ﬁnancial planning. In the absence of inﬂation risk, long-term
nominal bonds e.g. are riskless for long-term investors if the maturity equals
the horizon of the investor. If inﬂation risk is taken into account, however,
Campbell and Viceira (2005) report that the annualized standard deviation of
real returns on these bonds is as large as 8% and exceeds that of stocks for
maturities of over 35 years. Risk-averse long-term investors therefore exhibit
a strong preference for index-linked bonds if available. The difference between
the expected return on nominal bonds and that on real bonds with the same
maturity is known as the inﬂation risk premium. The inﬂation risk premium
is substantial (0.7% per annum on average) and decreases in the real rate and
increases with expected inﬂation (Burashi and Jiltsov (2005)). Less risk-averse
investors should take these ﬂuctuations of the risk premium over the business
cycle (from 0.2% to 1.4%) into account in their decision whether or not to
hedge inﬂation risk.
Campbell and Viceira (2001) report that the certainty equivalent wealth
effect of access to inﬂation indexed bonds for short-sell constrained
investors48 can be as large as 10–30%.49 In reality, inﬂation linked assets
are often not available to individual investors. To a lesser extent, this is also
true for institutional investors.50 These investors therefore face the question
48 Note though that Campbell and Viceira (2001) abstract form labor income.
49 The welfare gains of access to real rather than nominal annuities have been considered
e.g. by Brown et al. (2001). Koijen et al. (2006a) extend this analysis to access to real as well
as equity linked annuities.
50 In the UK inﬂation linked bonds are traded and a number of other countries introduced
them recently. Still there could be a gap between the inﬂation index that is traded (e.g. national
price inﬂation) and the inﬂation rate that is relevant to the investor (e.g. regional wage inﬂa-
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to what extent indexed bonds can be replicated by nominal bonds. The time
variation in nominal and real interest rates can be adequately captured by
ﬂuctuations in the real interest rate and in expected inﬂation. Expected inﬂa-
tion is much more persistent than the real rate, whereas the risk premium
for real interest rate risk exceeds that for ﬂuctuations in expected inﬂation.
Unconstrained investors can exploit the differences between bonds with dif-
ferent maturities with respect to the sensitivities to the real rate and expected
inﬂation factor in order to hedge away substantial parts of the inﬂation risk
using sophisticated dynamic trading strategies. Unexpected inﬂation however
can not be hedged without access to inﬂation-linked assets. Morever, many
investors will be constrained to hedge against the real interest and expected
inﬂation factors or will not be equipped to implement dynamic trading strat-
egies. Institutional investors like pension funds or insurers can create value
here.
If inﬂation sensitive assets are not available for the investor, the minimum
variance portfolio for a long term investor is a horizon dependent mix of the
nominal bond with the corresponding maturity, stocks and cash. This implies
that when investors are forced to bear inﬂation risk they will shorten the
maturity of the bond portfolio (see Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2005)).This
implies that the optimal duration of the ﬁxed income portfolio is smaller than
that of the consumption proﬁle. In the Netherlands most pension schemes
issue nominal guarantees to their participants. The solvency requirements for
these guarantees imposed by the regulator lead them to extend the maturity
of their assets to that of their nominal liabilities. If individuals care about
the purchasing power rather than the nominal value of their pension, even
the most risk averse individuals would prefer a less than full reduction of the
duration mismatch between the assets and the liabilities.
6.2.4 Equity Risk Reconsidered
In the analysis so far we assumed that stock prices are generated by a random
walk, and that the (log) stock returns are independently normally distributed
with constant mean and volatility. The assumptions that stock returns fea-
ture constant expected returns (and hence are uncorrelated) and that their
risk level is constant have been challenged in the literature. In the sequel, we
address each of these assumptions as well as the implications of alternative
assumptions for optimal ﬁnancial planning.
There is a lively debate in the literature as to whether the expected stock
returns are time-varying.51 Many authors claim that the expected return on
equity depends on variables such as the dividend yield or the term spread so
that equity returns are to some extent predictable. The typical ﬁnding in the
51 See e.g. Ang and Bekaert (2006), Campbell and Yogo (2006), Cochrane (2006), Goyal and
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literature is that, at the low frequencies that are relevant for ﬁnancial plan-
ning over the life cycle, stock returns are negatively correlated, implying that
the stock market is mean reverting. As discussed in Subsection 3.2, both the
mean and the variance of the excess return vary in the same way with the
investment horizon (namely proportionally). If stock returns are mean revert-
ing, in contrast, the variance of the excess returns rises less rapidly with the
time horizon than the mean of the excess return. As a direct consequence,
stocks are less risky for long-term investors than for short-term investors so
that young investors should invest an even larger over their ﬁnancial wealth in
equities. Campbell, Chan and Viceira (2003) and Campbell and Viceira (2005)
show that the annualized standard deviation of real returns of about 17% of
a diversiﬁed stock portfolio is reduced to an annualized standard deviation of
only 8% on a 20-year horizon, which is in fact comparable to the annualized
variance of the real returns of nominal bonds with the same maturity that are
held to maturity. Bond portfolios with constant maturity are also somewhat
mean reverting.
A second assumption on the stock market process that we adopted so far
is that the volatility of stock returns is time-invariant. The literature contains
abundant evidence that this is not the case at shorter horizons and therefore
can be an approximation at lower frequencies at best. Chacko and Viceira
(2005) and Liu (2007) consider an incomplete markets setting with time vary-
ing volatility of equity returns. This volatility factor can not be traded. These
papers show that the impact of time variation in volatility on the optimal
asset allocation is small, in particular in the empirically relevant case of vol-
atility being negatively correlated with stock returns (so that stocks become
less risky if returns are high).
6.2.5 Longevity Risk
Longevity risk is important both for the ﬁnancial planning of individual
investors and for the optimal asset allocation of collective pension schemes.
Two types of longevity risk have been distinguished in the literature. Macro
longevity risk refers to uncertain development in future mortality rates due to
improved health care, changing in nutrition and habits, etc. Macro longevity
affects the average mortality of a pool of individuals, e.g. in a pension fund
or insurance pool. Micro longevity risk refers to the uncertainty for an indi-
vidual on whether or not he will survive, irrespective of changes in mortality
rates.
Micro longevity risk can not easily be traded on ﬁnancial markets because
of adverse selection. Older individuals typically have superior information on
their survival probabilities then the issuer of the annuity. As the asymmetry in
information becomes more important for older agents with poor health con-
ditions, annuities are irreversible. This gives rise to a fundamental trade-off
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of voluntary annuities to offer prices that are not actuarially fair for the pop-
ulation at large.52 Mandatory participation in a collective pension scheme
alleviates these adverse-selection problems.
In the absence of bequest motives and liquidity problems and in the
presence of a rich menu of annuities is available at not too actuarially
unfair prices, annuities are welfare improving (Davidoff et al. (2005); Poterba
(2006)). If real annuities or variable annuities that offer exposure to stock
markets are not available, annuities become less attractive to the individ-
ual investor. In view of the absence of adverse selection, collective pension
schemes offer annuities that are not available to individual investors. In par-
ticular, many collective schemes aim to offer real annuities through their
indexation ambition and imply some equity exposure because indexation is
reduced if investment returns are insufﬁcient. Another important aspect of
collective pension arrangements is that they usually impose deferred annu-
ities at an early age. Deferred annuities, i.e. annuities that only generate cash
ﬂows after a deferral period, are often not available in voluntary annuity mar-
kets. Even if the option would be available, one may wonder whether agents
would buy deferred annuities early in their life cycle. Deferred annuities can
be attractive because they offer a hedge against the conversion risk generated
by future ﬂuctuations in interest rates and, to a lesser extent, changes in mor-
tality rates.
Collective pension schemes usually impose uniform contribution rates on
their participants. Section 5 explored the impact of heterogeneity in risk
aversion and time preference, and referred to heterogeneity in non-pension
wealth. Longevity risk is another dimension of heterogeneity: the life expec-
tancy of women exceeds that of men, that of whites that of blacks and that
of highly educated persons that of less educated persons. Uniform contribu-
tion rates impose a welfare loss on individuals with low life expectancy due to
implicit value transfers from individuals with lower life expectancy to those
with longer life expectancy (see e.g. Brown (2002) and Finkelstein, Poterba
and Rothschild (2005)).
For pension funds and other issuers of annuity contracts macro longevity
risk is a relevant concern. Unexpected increases in life expectancy increase the
market value of their liabilities and can harm their solvency position. From
a macro-economic point of view, the natural issuer of longevity protection
are young and future generations. By issuing longevity bonds, the government
can offer instruments to insure the longevity risk of older people by shift-
ing it to younger cohorts, for example by conditioning the retirement age of
the public pension system on longevity. By this conditioning of the retirement
age, the government reduces the impact of longevity risk on its balance sheet.
52 Annuities can be attractive for individuals even if they are not actuarially fairly priced
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Macro longevity risk can in principle be traded on ﬁnancial markets (see
Blake et al. (2006)) although attempts to introduce longevity bonds have
failed so far. Through ﬁnancial markets, macro longevity risks can be diver-
siﬁed between pools, sectors and countries. Note that the scope for diversiﬁ-
cation is limited if changes in health care and life style affect all populations
in approximately the same way at the same point in time.
6.3 Preferences
This subsection explores the implications of a coefﬁcient of relative risk aver-
sion that is not constant. Subsection 6.3.1 ﬁrst of all considers the impli-
cations of minimum consumption needs. Subsections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 subse-
quently consider external and internal habits, respectively. Finally, Subsections
6.3.4 and 6.3.5 investigate loss aversion and endogenous reference points.
6.3.1 Required Minimum Consumption
Preferences may imply that people require a minimum amount of consump-












where ¯ Ct ≥0 represents the minimum (or necessary or required) consumption
level at time t.














0 −t exp(−rx) ¯ Cx+tdx stands for the discounted value (using the
risk-free rate as a discount rate) of the minimum consumption levels over the
rest of the life cycle and f is the solution for fi in (4) with θi = θ. Intui-
tively, the investor ﬁrst invest in risk-free assets Xt to guarantee the minimum
consumption level and then invests a ﬁxed fraction f (given by (4)) of remain-
ing wealth (Wt − Xt) in risk-bearing assets. In the terminology of asset-liabil-
ity management (ALM), one thus matches the ﬁxed liability Xt with risk-free
assets. Indeed, comparing the second equality in (17) (with Wt =Ft since Ht =
0) with the corresponding equality in (5), we see that human wealth Ht acts
like a risk-free asset, while the value of the minimum consumption levels Xt
functions like a risk-free liability. Deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions, which guarantee
a particular consumption level in retirement, can thus be viewed as the opti-
mal consumption level for somebody who requires a certain minimum con-
sumption level in retirement (i.e. ¯ Ct >0f o rt >T). The need for a guaranteedSAVING AND INVESTING OVER THE LIFE CYCLE 403
level of consumption in retirement forces the pension fund to take less risk
and invest a larger share of retirement wealth in risk-free assets compared to
the case without the need for consumption guarantees.
An alternative interpretation of optimal risk exposure is that preferences
exhibit decreasing instead of constant relative risk aversion. In particular, one





σθ as the solution for fi
from (4) with θi =θ/((1− Xt
Wt )). Accordingly, relative risk aversion θi decreases
with wealth Wt. The local curvature of the utility function depends on how
far overall wealth is above wealth required for minimum consumption. People
thus become less willing to tolerate risk if the wealth level drops and become
closer to this minimum wealth level. Accordingly, a low power coefﬁcient θ
can still imply high levels of relative risk aversion.
The implications of preferences (16) for saving behavior depend on how
the minimum consumption ﬂows ¯ Ct develop over time and whether people
correctly anticipate this. If agents correctly anticipate rising minimum con-
sumption needs d ¯ Ct/dt > 0, they may save more, especially because larger
coefﬁcients of risk aversion θi =θ/((1− Xt
Wt )) boost saving incentives.
6.3.2 External Habits
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) use the preferences (16) in which the con-
sumption requirements ¯ Ct vary with the history of aggregate consumption.
They employ these preferences to explain a number of asset pricing phenom-
ena, including a large equity premium that varies countercyclically. Investors
demand a high return on stocks because stocks perform poorly in recessions
when consumption levels Ct fall close to the minimum levels ¯ Ct. Agents thus
measure their consumption level compared to that of the rest of the popu-
lation. This desire to "catch up with the Jones" implies a form of reference
drift. Empirical estimates typically ﬁnd that reference consumption levels are
in fact close to actual consumption levels, implying high levels of risk aver-
sion θi =θ/((1− Xt
Wt )).
6.3.3 Internal Habits
This external habit formation contrasts with internal habit formation where
consumption requirements ¯ Ct depend on the history of individual consump-
tion rather than aggregate consumption of the economy as a whole. Constan-
tinides (1990), for example, assumes that habits of an individual ¯ Ct depend on
actual consumption levels of that same individual as follows
d ¯ Ct/dt=βCt −α ¯ Ct
Internal habit formation implies more complicated behavior if agents antici-
pate how their current consumption levels Ct affect future consumption needs
¯ Ct+s. For example, consumption at two neighbouring points in time become404 BOVENBERG, KOIJEN, NIJMAN AND TEULINGS
complements: a high consumption level at time t raises, by its effect on hab-
its ¯ Ct+s, the marginal utility of consumption in the immediate future t +s.
Hence, ceteris paribus θ in (15), the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
declines with β as agents dislike rapid changes in consumption levels more.
As time elapses and s increases, the impact of higher consumption level at
time t on habits ¯ Ct+s declines on account of the positive depreciation coef-
ﬁcient α>0.53
This explains why, following an unexpected shock in wealth at the long-
run equilibrium level Ct = α
β ¯ Ct, consumption adjusts does not adjust immedi-
ately to its long-run level but adjusts gradually over time. Compared to the
case with preferences without habit formation (i.e. α = β = 0), the immedi-
ate adjustment of consumption to a wealth shock is less, but adjustment later
is larger as habits have adjusted to the changed consumption level. Innova-
tions in consumption will now be correlated and the optimal consumption
no longer follows a random walk. Internal habit formation thus explains why
pension schemes adjust their premia levels only gradually following an unex-
pected shock. Hence, consumption is less volatile with internal habits for two
reasons. First, shocks are absorbed more in the long run than in the short
run. Second, agents invest less aggressively so that they have to adjust their
consumption less in the short run.
Habit formation (i.e. α,β > 0) implies also that the ability to absorb an
unexpected shock increases if time increases. This implies that younger agents
with longer horizons can adjust more easily to shocks and thus should invest
a larger share of their wealth in risk-bearing assets. Intuitively, they have more
time to adjust their habits to unexpected shocks. In addition to human wealth
that is not exposed to equity risk and mean-reversion of returns, internal
habit formation is thus a third reason why young agents should optimally
invest a larger share of their portfolio in equity than older agents do and why
pension contracts may optimally get more of a deﬁned-beneﬁt nature when
people grow older. Habit formation also explains why retirement beneﬁts may
be linked to earnings (and consumption levels) close to retirement.
The implications of internal habits for saving behavior (and intertempo-
ral consumption smoothing over time) depend on the initial habit level ¯ C0.
If young agents start with low habit levels, they optimally should save more
since high initial consumption levels raise consumption needs later in life.
As people get older, they raise consumption levels as the horizons become
shorter over which the negative future external effects of current consumption
53 Internal habit formation can thus explain why risk aversion declines with time (and the
intertemporal elasticity of consumption increases with time). Shocks can be easier absorbed
and consumption levels can change more over time if agents have more time to adjust their
consumption needs. Just as Epstein-Zin preferences, internal habit formation can imply that










Figure 15 – A utility function with constant relative risk aversion
levels materialize. Overall then, habit formation can explain why consumption
levels typically rise over the life cycle in line with income levels.
6.3.4 Loss Aversion
Standard utility functions, which are twice differentiable, imply that the costs
of risk (see the denominator of the fraction at the right-hand side of (3)) are
proportional to the variance of a portfolio, f 2σ2. Figure 15 illustrates why
this is the case. The utility function u(C) is given by the concave curve. Con-
sider the effect on utility of both a positive deviation C+ and a negative,
C− from the mean value, Co, keeping the expected value constant. This utility
effect of risk (the required risk premium) can be shown graphically by the dif-






at Co. A twice as large a deviation of C+ and C− from the mean Co causes
approximately a four time as big effect on utility.54
Recent experimental work, however, suggests that human behavior is not
always well described by twice differentiable concave utility functions. Tversky
and Kahnemann (1992) therefore developed prospect theory to better describe
human behavior with respect to risk. In particular, behavior seems better cap-
tured by the type of kinked utility function depicted in Figure 16. This util-
54 Mathematically, this result relies on a second-order Taylor expansion. The cost of risk tak-
ing rises exactly quadratically with the magnitude of the deviations if the coefﬁcient of relative










Figure 16 – A kinked utility function as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
ity features a kink at the so-called reference point: a gain from this refer-
ence point yields only a small increase in utility, while a loss yields a large
decrease.55 This kink implies ﬁrst-order risk aversion at the reference point:
an individual is sensitive to small deviations from this reference point. This
kink in fact implies that risk aversion is particularly large at consumption
levels close to the reference point.56 In other words, relative risk aversion is
not constant but depends on the actual consumption level and the particu-
lar losses and gains considered. A second57 element of prospect theory is that
agents are risk averse in gains (twice as large gains yield less than twice as
much increase in utility) and risk loving in losses (twice as big losses yield
less than twice as much decrease in utility) (see Figure 16). This implies that
agents in effect exhibit a large preference for consumption levels close to the
target level of the reference point. If their current wealth is insufﬁcient to
ﬁnance the consumption level at the reference point, they will take risks to get
close to it. If their wealth level exceeds the target level, in contrast, they will
shy away from risks in order to prevent the risk of falling below the target
level. This is especially so if their wealth level is just sufﬁcient to ﬁnance con-
55 On the basis of experimental work, Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) ﬁnd that losses tend
to weigh about 2 1/4 times more heavily than gains.
56 This explains why it is often difﬁcult to empirically disentangle risk aversion from loss
aversion.
57 A third element is that decision-makers employ subjective decision weights that differ from










Figure 17 – Utility function with a kink at consumption level C0
sumption at the reference point: the kink implies a relatively high local level
of risk aversion.
Prospect theory, and the kink at the reference point in particular, has
important implications for risk taking over time. We can best explain this by
the piece-wise linear utility function with a kink at the average consumption







that exercise for a twice as large deviation from the mean Co (ceteris pari-
bus the expected value). We then observe that the cost of risk taking increases
proportionally in the deviation rather than quadratically as with a smooth
concave utility function. This implies that the cost of risk taking (i.e. the
risk premium) increases with the square root of the time horizon because the
expected standard deviations rise with the time horizon in this way as the
draws are independent of time.58 This is in contrast to the case of a smooth
concave utility function when the cost of risk taking increases quadratically
with the deviations and thus linearly with the time horizon, see Figure 15.
With kinked utility, the marginal beneﬁt of risk taking (i.e. the excess return
¯ µT) increases linearly in the investment horizon while the associated marginal
cost increases only with the square root of the time horizon σ
√
T. As a direct
consequence, optimal risk taking increases with the time horizon. This yields
another reason why young agents should bear more risk than old agents: loss
58 If the draws were perfectly positively correlated, the expected deviations would increase
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aversion as described by prospect theory implies that young agents with long
horizons should invest more in equity than old agents.
Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) argue that people are reluctant to invest in
stocks because of a combination of loss aversion and a short planning hori-
zon. People evaluate stocks over periods that are shorter than their true long-
run horizon. This so-called myopic loss aversion explains why agents require
a high risk premium on equity. Pension funds can correct this distortion by
investing more in equity than individuals would do. Myopic loss aversion also
suggest that pension schemes should not report their wealth levels too fre-
quently to their members because this would stimulate the tendency of the
members to evaluate their wealth on an excessively short time horizon.
Berkelaar et al. (2004) revisit the relationship between length of the invest-
ment horizon and risk taking if utility not only exhibits a kink at the refer-
ence point (or target level) for retirement wealth but also implies risk aversion
in gains and risk seeking behavior in losses (as is suggested by prospect the-
ory). As long as agents are above and close to the reference point, they invest
less in risk bearing assets if the retirement date approaches. Intuitively, they
have less time to make up losses if a bad shock would reduce their wealth
below the target level. Hence, they converge to a portfolio insurance strategy
as retirement gets close and their wealth level is just sufﬁcient to ﬁnance the
target level of retirement consumption. If wealth drops inadvertently below
that needed to ﬁnance the target level, however, the investor attempts to gam-
ble his way out by investing more in equity – especially if the planning hori-
zon is short.
Ang et al. (2005) formulate a model of disappointment aversion based on
the axiomatic disappointment-aversion framework of Gul (1991). Compared
to a familiar CRRA utility, utility features a kink at the certainty equivalent
outcome: losses are overweighted compared to gains. As a consequence of the
kink at the reference point, risk aversion is locally higher closer to the refer-
ence point than further away from it.
A kinked, piece-wise linear utility function can be approximated as a lin-
ear combination of the excess return on a portfolio and a term that is closely
related to the semi standard deviation of returns. With a smooth, twice differ-
entiable, concave utility function, in contrast, utility can be approximated by
a linear combination of the excess return and the variance of returns. Boender
et al. (2006) employ a semi-variance criterion to evaluate consumption during
retirement. One can view this criterion function as a special case of the loss-
aversion speciﬁcation in which gains above the reference point do not yield
utility at all, agents are risk averse in losses, while the reference point equals
the ambition level of the pension system (70% of the ﬁnal wage in the case
of Boender et al. (2006)). This study implicitly assumes that agents are risk
neutral with respect to consumption during the working life because only the
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extensive evaluation of this study and an interpretation of it in terms of util-
ity functions, see Boender et al. (2006).
6.3.5 Endogenous Reference Point
The reference point in prospect literature plays a similar role as the habit level
in the habit-formation literature.59 Hence, the literature has explored what
happens if the reference point adjusts over time in response to current con-
sumption levels and rational investors anticipate this (see, e.g. Barberis et al.
(2001), and Berkelaar et al. (2004)). Berkelaar et al. (2004) ﬁnd that updating
the reference point implies more risk taking. Intuitively, preferences are more
ﬂexible: with adverse shocks the point from which gains and losses are being
evaluated and to which you want to be close is adjusted downwards.
Barberis et al. (2001) explore a setting in which investors derive direct util-
ity from not only consumption but also from ﬂuctuations in their ﬁnancial
wealth. After a run-up in stock prices, the agent gets further away from this
reference point and thus becomes less risk averse. History thus determines
risk aversion. Just as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), this variation in risk
aversion allows the equilibrium returns to be much more volatile than the
underlying fundamentals. In contrast to the consumption-based approach of
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), however, investors care about ﬂuctuations in
ﬁnancial wealth even if they are unrelated to consumption.
Dybvig (1995) considers a model with extreme loss aversion and immediate
adjustment of the reference point to changes in consumption: consumption
is not allowed to decline.60 Consumption develops smoothly and increases
each time wealth reaches a new maximum. At each point in time, a part of
wealth is set apart to match the risk-free liability of the current consump-
tion level. The wealth in excess of this level is used to take risks so as to
ﬁnance increases in consumption. The behavior of the consumer thus resem-
bles that of a click fund or a so-called escalating annuity. This model obvi-
ously explains why consumption increases over time and tends to be low at
the beginning of the life cycle. In fact, individuals want to save even if their
income is expected to rise over time. Borrowing constraints are thus less rel-
evant.
59 A difference is that consumption can fall below the reference point with loss aversion but
that consumption cannot fall below the necessary consumption level. Loss aversion thus gives
rise to less extreme portfolio insurance as with habits. In particular, a loss-averse investor wants
to stay above the target level but this is not absolutely necessary. In bad states that are very
expensive, the individual accepts losses and may actually become risk seeking to make up the
losses in order to return to a point above the reference point. However, habits can also be
speciﬁed in a way that allows consumption to fall below the habit. In particular, habits can
be included multiplicatively rather than additively as in (16), i.e. C/ ¯ C rather than C − ¯ C enters
the utility function. See Gomes and Michaelides (2003) and Davidoff et al. (2005).
60 This can be easily generalized for an exogenously speciﬁed minimum growth rate or max-
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the academic literature on optimal saving and invest-
ment over the life cycle. We started out with a simple benchmark model in
which human capital is riskless, standard preferences apply and equity risk
is the only risk factor. Within this benchmark model we derived the opti-
mal individual contract in both the absence and the presence of constraints
on borrowing against future labor income. We also considered a number of
collective pension contracts and discussed the advantages and disadvantages
of collective versus individual pension schemes. The ﬁnal section explored
a number of extensions of the benchmark framework. We considered more
elaborate models of human capital, additional risk factors in ﬁnancial mar-
kets as well as non-standard speciﬁcations of preferences.
Section 6 indicates a wide variety of questions for future research on this
fascinating and highly relevant topic. Among other things, it points to the
importance of the nature of human capital for saving and investment behav-
ior. This suggests that pension plans should be tailored to the type of human
capital of individuals. Hence, pools in collective pension schemes should be
based on that. Another implication of the relevance of human capital is
that ﬁnancial economics and labor economics should be integrated more. An
important future research topic concerns saving and investment implications
of the career pattern of women, which account for an increasingly important
share of labor supply in modern economies. This career pattern differs in a
number of important aspects from that of men. Family risks (i.e. elderly par-
ents, young children) are new sources of idiosyncratic risk (see also the survey
by Browning and Crossley (2001)).
Whereas endogenous labor supply extends the scope of risk sharing by
adding consumption of leisure as an additional way to adjust to shocks, it
also allows individuals to evade the risk-sharing contract ex post. In this way,
it weakens the commitment of future workers to risk sharing with current
generations. An important issue for future research is to endogenize to what
extent pension schemes can adopt the continuity perspective by modelling the
mobility of labor, capital, and consumers. In this way, we can model the opti-
mal recovery period, i.e. optimal risk sharing among non-overlapping genera-
tions. As a short cut, we can impose a maximum tax that workers are willing
to pay ex post as part of a risk-sharing contract.
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